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Comparing Fundamentalisms:
A Social Movement Theory
Approach
David Romney

In the last forty years, the emergence of a number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups has resulted in a number of comparative studies that try to explain this phenomenon (e.g., Antoun and Hegland 1987; Sivan and Friedman 1990).
Although scholars have argued varying reasons for this recent religious resurgence,
most have recognized the importance of the 1967 Israeli War (Six-Day War) to both
Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist movements. Some of these scholars see the religious resurgence following this war as a continuation of religious sentiments expressed by pre-1967 Zionist and fundamentalist Islamic groups rather than as a new
movement (Davis 1987, 149-52). Others, while stressing the importance of previous
Islamic revivalism, note the 1967 war marked a turning point for both Islamist and
Jewish groups (Esposito 2005, 160-65). Some also see global trends that unite not just
Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups but all fundamentalist groups (Keddie
1998). Others take a different tack, claiming Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist movements are actually quite different from each other and only superficially mirror each
other. For instance, Hunter asserts that when compared to Islamic fundamentalism,
Jewish fundamentalism focuses more on the possibility of future failures and the importance of preventing these failures rather than on past grievances or experiences
(1993,31-32). In spite of this research, two basic questions about Islamism and Jewish fundamentalism remain unanswered: 1) What effect has the 1967 War had on the
Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements, and 2) Do these movements mirror
each other or have they developed independently?
Using a social movement theory (SMT) approach, I will argue that post-1967 Jewish and Islamic fundamentalist movements mirror each other in a number of crucial
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ways. According to SMT, individual political desires are translated into group-based
social movements through the presence of appropriate social movement organizations (SMOs; Wiktorowicz 2004). As outlined by Robinson (2004), the presence and
use of three factors can enhance the viability of an SMO: changes in political opportunity structures, effective mobilizing structures, and correct cultural framing. Robinson and Wiktorowicz have shown how Islamist activist groups can be analyzed under a social movement theory framework, but aside from Munson (2008), no one has
applied this framework to explain Jewish activist groups. In this paper, I will show
post-1967 fundamentalist Jewish movements, like their Islamist counterparts, can be
better understood through SMT. By applying SMT, three ideas are made apparent:
1) The political opportunity structures for both Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist
groups changed as a result of the 1967 war, stimulating the appearance of new SMOs
on both sides after this war, 2) SMOs of both sides have used similar mobilizing structures since the 1967 war, and 3) since the 1967 War, SMOs of both sides have used
cultural framing to address three similar issues: unfaithful coreligionists, the status of
the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.
I will use a purposefully broad definition of fundamentalism for this study. For
the purposes of this paper, I define religious fundamentalist groups as those striving for religious orthodoxy. Although this definition is not specific, it allows me to
look broadly at different fundamentalist movements. In this study, I will focus on
examples from the fundamentalist movements of Hamas, Gush Emunim, and Kach,
all of which conform to this definition of fundamentalism.
The 1967 Israeli War changed the political opportunity structures for Islamist
and Jewish fundamentalist movements. For this study, changes in political opportunity structures are defined according to Robinson's definition: political changes that
alter the opportunities available for an SMO (2004, 123). For Islamist movements,
the capture of the occupied territories in the 1967 War was such a change. The failure
of the Arab forces in this war and Israel's occupation of the Gaza strip and the West
Bank led Palestinians to depend less on foreign sources of organization for their nationalistic movements, because foreign powers were forced to loosen their hold on
parts of Palestine. Up until the 1967 War, resistance against Israel by the Palestinians
consisted of fedayeen (suicide squads) attacks from Egypt or other states; however,
as a result of the 1967 War, Israel began to occupy the areas where these attacks had
originated (Tessler 1994,399-464). Israel was able to rid these areas of many fedayeen
fighters, but they were unsuccessful in getting rid of all of them. Over time, this neglect led to the emergence of many Palestinian activist groups, now more effective,
because they have been operating inside Israeli-controlled territory.
For Jewish fundamentalist movements, the same event-the gain of territory after the 1967 War-changed political opportunity structures by allowing these movements to pursue their goal of incorporating Judea and Samaria in the state of Israel.
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Some groups, particularly the revisionist Zionists led by Jabotinsky, expressed their
desire early on to bring all of historical Palestine within the borders of the modern
Israeli state. Before the 1967 War this goal was impossible to achieve. There were two
main reasons the 1967 War changed this situation. First, after the war, the ownership
of Judea and Samaria was a reality, not a dream (at least as far as the Israelis were
concerned). Fulfilling these territorial desires was, therefore, a physical possibility.
Second, many secular and religious Jews, not just fundamentalist groups, supported
territorial expansion immediately following the 1967 War. As Sprinzak outlines,
immediately following this war, Israeli politics were dominated by two camps: the
maximalists (those who advocated territorial expansion, believing the occupied territories helped Israel better defend itself) and the minimalists (those who believed
territorial compromise with the Arabs would help better secure the state of Israel)
(1999, 115-16). Some of these maximalists wanted to spur settler movement into the
West Bank for religious reasons. Kahane, who drew from Jabotinsky's ideology in
explaining the religious justification for expansion, is perhaps the most famous religious maximalist from this time period (191). However, other maximalists wanted to
expand for security reasons. They felt gaining this territory would provide the state
of Israel with a buffer zone that would keep them safe from future attacks. This reasoning, although opposed by the minimalists who could not "ignore the implications
of having become an occupying power," attracted secular and fundamentalist Jews,
lending a broad support base to the settler movement (Oz 1983, 133). For these two
reasons, territorial gains after the 1967 war changed the opportunities available to
Jewish fundamentalist groups.
Since 1967, Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups have also used similar
mobilizing structures, defined as networks, which enhance the ability of an SMO to
recruit new members. In the years following the 1967 war, a huge spike in mosque
construction and the creation of al-mujamma' al-Islami-an "Islamic collective" that
eventually oversaw 40 percent of the mosques in Gaza strip as well as a university
(Robinson 1997, 137)-formed an extensive mobilizing structure the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas used to recruit new members. As outlined by Robinson, the 1973
establishment of the mujamma' in the Gaza strip was, in part, a response to the secular
nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and, in part, a result of
changes following the 1967 War (136-47). Seeing the success the PLO had achieved
in mobilizing activists through grassroots movements at Palestinian universities, the
Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza wanted similar organizations that would promote nationalistic ideology with an Islamist tinge. Because of the failure of secular governments during the 1967 War and increasing dissatisfaction of citizens, the mujamma's
message was in some ways more palatable to the increasingly religious society. Evidences of this increasing religious fervor included doubling the number of mosques
in the Gaza strip, a rise in the popularity of religious literature, and the establishment
3
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of a number of Islamic universities for teaching Islamic law (136). According to
Abu-Amr, mosques were the most important tools in recruiting (1993, 7-8). The Muslim Brotherhood, through the mujamma', also ran libraries, social clubs, and other social organizations that endeared the population to Hamas. In the mosques, protected
from Israeli interference out of a respect for religion, is where they recruited members
by disseminating their ideas after the daily prayer services (1993, 8). By channeling
the society's religious fervor in a political direction, and by organizing several institutions under the centralized al-mujamma' al-islami, the Muslim ~rotherhood, and
later Hamas, gained an audience for their message.
Similarly, after the 1967 War, the yeshivot (schools for Talmudic study) in Israel
played a crucial role in the formation and recruitment efforts of the Jewish fundamentalist group Gush Emunim. One yeshiva in particular, Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav, has
been important throughout Gush Emunim's history. In May 1967, just three weeks
before the 1967 War, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook powerfully declared his frustration
at the fact the Jews did not yet hold all of Biblical Israel, stating, "Where is our Hebron-are we forgetting it? Where is our Shechem? Are we forgetting it? And where
is our Jericho-are we forgetting it? And where is the eastern bank of the Jordan"
(Segev 2007, 181)? When, after the war, Israel gained the exact cities Rabbi Kook had
mentioned in his speech, many of his followers saw Israel's victory as a miracle. Some
of the students from the Yeshiva, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were inspired by this
"miracle" to found Kiryat Arba, a settlement located just on the outskirts of Hebron.
Kiryat Arba was the first settlement of what would later be called the Gush Emunim
movement. Although the Gush Emunim movement would not be officially established until 1974, when the Yom Kippur War helped its movement gain more steam,
its roots are found in the reaction of Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav to the 1967 War.
This yeshivah continued to be the primary means of recruitment as the movement progressed, and other yeshivot also began to support Gush Emunim. Like almujamma' al-islami, the yeshivot combined both religious and social services into
one institution. The students there grow up together and spend time with the same
teachers, developing social ties equivalent to those developed in the social clubs and
mosques of the mujamma'. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook took advantage of these close
associations between students to encourage them to join the settlements, forming the
ideologically devoted core that the movement needed during this formative stage
(Sprinzak 1991, 125). During the period between the 1967 War and the formal organization of Gush Emunim, other yeshivot began to join by providing support, particularly the yeshivot of the Bnei Akiva movement. Even after 1974, when formal
organizations were created to help with recruitment, the youth of Merkaz ha-Rav
still continued to play an important role, inspiring others to join the movement (126).
Cultural framing, the last similarity between Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist movements I will address, is perhaps the most interesting of the three. In SMT,
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cultural framing is an assemblage of tools through which we interpret the world
around us (Wiktorowicz 2004, 15). According to Robinson, these tools are most effective when condensed into a pithy, "bumper sticker" statement; statements like these
allow potential members to easily understand and either identify with or reject an
SMa's ideological leanings (Robinson 2004, 116-17). The religious rhetoric Islamist
and Jewish fundamentalist groups used to address certain issues conforms to this description. Particularly, after the 1967 War, Islamist movements and Jewish fundamentalist movements began to use similar cultural framing devices to when approaching
three topics: less faithful coreligionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past
failures or tragedies.
After 1967, fundamentalist groups on both sides increasingly demonize their less
pious coreligionists, accusing them of undermining their righteous plans. According to Esposito (2005, 166), the issue of less faithful coreligionists is important for
Islamist groups for two reasons: 1) They believe it is necessary to institute Sharia law
before a government is considered legitimate, and 2) They believe jihad is incumbent upon all Muslims. In order for these two goals to be accomplished, Muslims in
these fundamentalist groups need the help of other Muslims. For this reason, some of
these groups have asserted that coreligionists who do not support Sharia law or jihad
against unbelievers are the same as atheists or infidels. However, unlike Jewish fundamentalists, those deemed infidels are often government leaders rather than those
leaning or of another political party. For instance, Hamas has often criticized Fatah,
the main faction of the PLO, with these terms. Because Hamas criticizes Fatah with
respect to an increasingly popular religious viewpoint (as already outlined, Gazans
are becoming increasingly religious at this point in time), this term reverberates well
with the population.
Jewish fundamentalist groups tend to demonize their less faithful coreligionists in
a similar manner. For Jewish fundamentalists, the issue of less faithful coreligionists
is important because they believe that immoral actions by secular Jews will delay the
coming of the Messiah. These fundamentalists also blame the continuation of the ArabIsraeli conflict on the seculars, thinking that removing the secular Jews will allow
God to fulfill the promises made to the Jews in the Hebrew Bible. A quote from Benjamin Ze' ev Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, illustrates the intensity with which
those on the Jewish side express these convictions:
The problem is not the Arabs-the problem is the Jews. The truth, the way we
look at it, is that there has never been an Arab problem. We could have solved
that problem in forty-eight hours, if only we wanted to. The real war is not with
Arabs but with the Hellenized Jews. All the blood shed by Arab terrorism is
"as if" shed by the Arabs; the people really responsible for the bloodshed are
Jews scared by the Gentiles and attached to distorted Western ideas. (Sprinzak
1999,264-65)
5
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Here, the out-group being criticized is not, as is often the case, the Arabs; rather, it is
secular Jews, who are not dedicated to the in-group's idea of what it means to be a
"righteous" Jew, who receive the criticism.
Similar sentiments are expressed by those who apply the term "self-hating Jew"
to others. This term has a long history of use: Herzl used it to describe those opposed to
Zionism; some applied it to Jews in America, Germany, and other Western countries when the expansion of Hitler's power and the persecution of the Jews in other
countries threatened Jews as a people; and politicians have used i~ to describe those
who oppose Israeli policy (Finlay 2005, 11-15). Following the 1967 War, it has been
used by Jewish fundamentalists to describe secular Jews, and because of its long history of use and its relation to the holocaust, it has easily become a "bumper sticker"
term. A usage example of the term is found in a statement by Rabbi Meir Kahane, a
fundamentalist who established the Jewish Defense League in 1968 following the
1967 War. He used this term to describe Jewish leftists when he wrote that Israel is
"crawling with ... Hebrew speaking goyim [non-Jews] whose self-hate ... drives them
to reject Judaism" (Paine 1994, 13). More recently, Ariel Sharon has used this term to
describe the left when the Oslo peace process threatened the settler movement to the
West Bank, saying, "Terrible self-hate engulfs us .... Our leaders talk to Arafat about
disarming Jews and dismantling Jewish settlements" (Finlay 2005, 15). The use of
this term helps other like-minded Jews to quickly view fundamentalists in a positive
light. Therefore, both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist groups used pejoratives as
a cultural frame to attract new members who opposed less faithful coreligionists.
After the 1967 War, both Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists also began to use
cultural frames when discussing the land of Israel or Palestine. Before the 1967 War,
Palestinian claims to the land of Palestine were based on previous land ownership.
This is still the main reason Palestinians want to return to Palestine; many still keep
the keys to the homes they had to leave after the 1948 war, a symbolic reminder of
their ownership rights. However, after the territorial gains by Israel during the 1967
War caused Islamic soul-searching and increased religiosity, Hamas began to emphasize all of Israel belonged to the Muslims by religious mandate. They did this by using
a well-known Islamic concept of waqf (a religious endowment), usually consisting
of property or buildings given by Muslims to the community. Giving one's land as
a waqf is equivalent to donating it to God. After the 1967 War, Hamas began to declare: "Palestine is a waqf," a unique application of this religious term (Robinson
2004, 130-31). Although using the term in this manner is historically inaccurate, it
was still effective insofar that it added a religious flavor to the traditional Palestinian
right of return.
Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist groups have used religious cultural frames
when discussing the occupied territories. They did this by using biblical names and
stories in their attempts to get people to move into settlements. For instance, the
6
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leaders of Gush Emunim and the leaders of other fundamentalist groups call the West
Bank by its biblical names, Judea and Samaria. Also, present day ads for the settlements often make reference to famous stories from the Bible, implying the settlers are
a continuation of a holy tradition. Since these groups and other like-minded people
considered the victory in the 1967 War a miracle, using Biblical names like these reminds potential members of the spiritual nature of the 1967 victory, thereby framing
the current settler movement in a similar manner.
Lastly; Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists have both used cultural frames
when addressing how to overcome past failures or tragedies. For many Arabs, their
loss in the 1967 War marked their biggest failure in recent history. According to Esposito, many Islarnists blame recent Muslim failures, including the loss in 1967, on
a decline in religiosity (2005, 160-62). Therefore, religious frames during this time
period were effective for reaching out to those disaffected with the status quo. For
Islamists, and particularly Hamas, the greatest such frame has been that "Islam is
the solution." Robinson cites this slogan as the most popular slogan among modern
Islamist movements in the Middle East, noting this specific phrase and its sentiments
appear in Hamas's 1988 charter (2004, 130-31). Again, using a religious cultural frame
proves useful in attracting new members.
Jewish fundamentalist groups, on the other hand, have used the slogan "never
again" when addressing this issue. This is perhaps their most effective frame since the
Holocaust left such a large impact on Israel. This term was actually used before 1967;
it was popularized after the 1948 War as a deliberate attempt by the government to
wipe away the image of the "Holocaust Jew" (Almog 2000). Because these efforts by
the government still affect Jewish perceptions today; this frame resonates particularly
well with potential members. For this reason, Kahane uses this phrase as the title of
one of his books, which outlines the need for American Jews to rise up against those
fighting the state of Israel rather than being passive in this fight (1971).
Looking at these examples, we see SMT is particularly useful for evaluating Jewish
fundamentalist movements. By applying SMT in this study; we also see Jewish fundamentalist movements are quite similar to Islarnist fundamentalist movements. Lastly;
through application of SMT, we see a common explanation for the recent resurgence,
namely the changes in political opportunity structures, an effective use of mobilizing
structures, and a correct use of cultural frames since the 1967 war have together caused
the recent increase in the number of Islarnist and Jewish fundamentalist groups.
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The Role of Party Identification in a
Nonpartisan Election: A Case Study
in Provo, Utah
Sean Kelly and Allison Holmes

Introduction
Every November we are urged to go to the polls and vote for a wide range of
elected officials. The process in which we make our decision is largely influenced by
party identification. This is a low-cost tool voters use as they cast their ballots, but
when official party identification is removed, as it is in nonpartisan elections, how do
voters make their choice?
Nonpartisan elections originated from the hope that by removing party organizations from elections, voters would make their decisions for the best candidate and
not the party affiliation (Schaffner et aI., 2001, 9). Gerald C. Wright notes that "more
than three-fourths of municipal elections and about half of all U.S. elections use the
nonpartisan ballot" (2008, 13). With the large number of nonpartisan elections, political scientists still know little about the process voters go through in deciding who to
vote for in these types of elections. We argue that whether or not party identification is removed as a factor in a nonpartisan ballot election is largely dependent upon
campaign effects; where candidates use mailers, signs, phone calls, and door-to-door
contacts to frame and counter-frame one another in partisan terms.
The 2009 Provo City mayoral race, an area in which both the voters and the candidates heavily lean toward the Republican Party, provides an excellent setting to
analyze the effectiveness and use of campaign effects to introduce party identification in nonpartisan elections. The two mayoral candidates were Steve Clark and John
Curtis. Our hypothesis was that Clark, through campaign effects, would frame Curtis
as a democrat, making the election partisan. As a result, Clark would win the election
due to the high concentration of conservative voters. While our assumptions that
9
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Clark would frame Curtis as a democrat held true, Curtis counteracted Clark's efforts
with his own campaign and win the election. These results are aligned with our thesis
that in the absence of official party identification, candidates determine the impact of
political identification through their campaign strategy.

Literature Review
Nonpartisan elections were created to limit party influence in politics. Schaffner
et al. describe the progressive movement as the belief that by eliminating the influence of partisanship, elections would result in better outcomes, such as the election
of government officials who are more attentive to local needs (2001, 8). Schaffner et
al. go on to explain that the progressives' conclusions rely on an informed electorate
interested in obtaining the "common good" (Schaffner et al. 2001, 9).
This ideal of a caring, informed electorate is unrealistic. Research shows that
rather than spending hours online, reading the newspaper, or engaging in political
dialogue, voters look for low-cost cues to help them make their vote choice (Schaffner
et al. 2001,9; see also Lupia 1994; Popkins 1994). Essentially, this means even among
those who actually vote on Election Day, the majority have not invested much time
researching and seeking for the "common good." Campbell et al. in the American
Voter, explain that party identification is a significant low-cost tool that drives vote
choice on Election Day (1960).
In the absence of official party identification, voting behavior may be significantly
affected by other factors. In their study, Schaffner et al. conclude that without party
identification, voters rely on the most readily available low-cost cue-incumbency.
This augments the theory that voters do not take the time to search out the issues in
order to make informed decisions. Schaffner et al. also suggest that in nonpartisan
elections, "even a modestly effective campaign might have substantial effects where
voters have few readily available pointers on who they should support" (2001, 26).
Essentially, the theory that whoever wins the campaign contact battle will have a
greater chance of winning seems correct. This could be said of any election, but it is
more prevalent in nonpartisan elections where voters are more susceptible to campaign influence.
So far, the impact of removing party identification has been examined, and there
is research suggesting party affiliation may still be influential in nonpartisan elections. Peverill Squire and Eric R.A.N. Smith explain that voters may not need the
party officially identified on the ballot, because they "will pick up on partisan cues
in the environment" and it is possible for voters to still "use partisan information to
structure their voting decisions" (Peverill and Smith 1988, 177). This complements
the theory of Schaffner et al. that campaign effects have greater potential to influence
nonpartisan races. As a result, campaigns may turn nonpartisan elections partisan as
they frame either or both candidates as being directly affiliated with a certain party.
10
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Squire and Smith are not alone in their assumptions. Charles R. Adrian categorizes nonpartisan elections into one of four types. A type I election is when the candidate's party is easily identified and voters view the election in partisan terms (1959,
452). A type II election is where candidates are supported by a number of groups
including parties; this type of election still contains the influence of the party but
not as directly as in Type I elections due to the presence of other groups who are not
associated with either party but are still politically active in the election (1959, 453).
A type III election is characterized by the support of different interest groups for the
candidates but very little support from political parties. Lastly, a type N election
is one where political parties are not important in campaigns (1959, 457). Adrian's
article explains the party may playa role in nonpartisan elections in varying degrees
ranging from very involved in Type I nonpartisan elections to not involved at all in
Type N nonpartisan elections.
In summary, the campaign is the largest determinant of election type. David A.
Niven uses psychological research to explain how voters can be influenced. Voters
are influenced depending on "the accessibility of the message" and "[thinking] themselves personally affected by the message" (Niven 2004,871). Campaigns seek to influence vote choice; if they are successful in making their message "accessible" and
salient, they can determine the level of partisanship in an election. This will depend
on whether or not a candidate believes he or she has an advantage by attaching party
identification to the nonpartisan election.

A Case Study: Provo, Utah
The 2009 Provo City mayoral race offered an ideal opportunity to understand
how campaigns determine the effects of creating the illusion of partisanship in a nonpartisan election. Provo, Utah, is a distinctive place. The population is homogenousespecially among voters. The majority of residents are religiously active, politically
conservative, and family oriented. In fact, more than 70 percent of the population
identify themselves as republican (Appendix A, Table 1). While these demographics
make it difficult to apply our findings to other populations, it allows us to isolate and
analyze the role of partisan framing through campaign effects.
Both mayoral- candidates, Steve Clark and John Curtis, have similar characteristics that reflect the population: they are both white, middle-aged males and members
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. While neither one of them was
technically an incumbent, Steve Clark was serving as a State Representative. Therefore, we assumed any incumbent advantage would transfer to him. Previous to the
mayoral election, John Curtis had unsuccessfully run for a State House and Senate
seat. As a result of their backgrounds, both candidates had significant campaign experiences. Clark and Curtis were raised in the Provo area, have large families, and
were executives of successful local companies.
11
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The two main issues facing Provo voters were iProvo and zoning law issues.
When we looked at the candidates' web sites, we could not find a clear distinction
between their views on these issues. Therefore, we assumed the issues would play
little role in the outcome of the election.

Hypotheses
The literature suggests that even in a nonpartisan election, party identification
can playa significant role. Due to the Republican Party dominance in Provo, we believed that if a candidate had any history with the Democratic Party, it would be a
disadvantage to them at the polls.
While prominent members of the Republican Party endorsed both candidates,
Curtis previously had been both the vice-president and president of the Utah County
Democratic Party. As a result, we predicted Clark's campaign would frame Curtis as
a democrat to turn the election partisan. We hypothesized that Clark would win the
race with the clear republican advantage in Provo.

Data/Methodology
We collected campaign literature from both campaigns. This was necessary to
determine whether or not Clark used Curtis' political history against him. It was also
important to see how Curtis' campaign would respond to any suggestion that he was
not "republican enough" to be the Provo mayor. Because we were interested in partisan framing, the only mailers we analyzed in this study were those that identified
Curtis as a democrat and his response to those attacks.
We used data from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll to evaluate the effectiveness of
both campaigns. The exit poll has been in operation since 1982 and has consistently
been the most accurate poll in Utah. On Election Day, there were pollsters at all nineteen voting locations. They selected voters at a random interval based on the projected turnout for their given location. On Election Day, 10,750 people voted, and over
2,500 participated in the exit poll. We used three questions from the survey: the first
measured the party identification of each voter, the second measured the perceived
party identification of the candidates, and the third, a count of the campaign contacts
the voters received during the campaign (Appendix 3).
Perceived candidate party identification, which will be referred to as candidate
party identification, was measured on a seven-point scale (Campbell et aI., 1960). The
lower a voter ranked the candidate on the scale, the stronger their perception that
candidate is a democrat. The "other" and "don't know" categories were also included
in the question. We dropped these responses from our data and only considered options one through seven. We subtracted the party identification of Clark from Curtis to use as the dependent variable in our regression model. This produced a scale
ranging from negative six to positive six. This scale was treated as semi-continuous
and was analyzed in an ordinary; least-squares regression measuring the effect of
12
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campaign in determining the difference in candidate party identification. A negative
coefficient indicates voters saw Curtis as being more republican than Clark, and a
positive coefficient indicates voters saw Clark as more republican. A response of zero
meant voters saw no difference between the candidate's party identification (Appendix 2, Figure 1).
Campaign effects were measured via a question asking voters the ways they
were contacted by each campaign. The question included nine ways the voters could
have been contacted, including personal contact from the candidate or campaign,
mailers, blogs, etc. (Appendix 3, Figure 3). The results of this question can be seen
in Table 4 (Appendix 1). We used this data in several ways. First, we included in the
model if they had received a letter from Clark or a letter from Curtis. We analyzed
this separately from the others, because it was the only campaign effect used to shape
candidate party identification. We did this to see if the letters would have a significant
impact on candidate party identification. After totaling the contacts, we calculated
the difference between Clark's total campaign contacts and Curtis' total campaign
contacts (Appendix 2, Graph 2) to examine the distribution of campaign contacts for
Clark and Curtis. This distribution, as demonstrated by the negative values on the
x-axis, shows Curtis' campaign contacted more individuals than Clark's. Lastly, we
included a model controlling whether a voter had received mail from both candidates
(Appendix 1, Table 3). This table shows the majority of individuals who reported being contacted by a campaign received letters from both Curtis and Clark. This was
calculated to see if the impact of letters on painting the partisanship of a candidate
was statistically significant beyond the impact of receiving a letter on its own. If our
thesis is correct, then campaign effects would be significant in determining how voters perceived candidate party identification. A null finding would be because voters
saw no difference in party identification between Clark and Curtis and, thus, the election was in reality nonpartisan.

Results
John Curtis ultimately won the election but not without Steve Clark attempting to make the election about party affiliation. As was predicted, Clark's campaign
sent out mail explaining to voters that Curtis had previously run for State Senate as
a democrat and later was both the president and vice-president of the Utah County
Democratic Party (Appendix 4, Figure 1). Curtis then countered with his own mailer
explaining why he had previously run as a democrat and why it was not important
for the Provo mayoral election (Appendix 4, Figure 2).
Candidate party identification was measured by calculating the mean party
identification score for each candidate. These results may be seen in Table 2 (Appendix 1). This table shows Clark had a higher mean score than Curtis. Essentially
voters saw Clark as being more republican. While Clark was not able to persuade
13
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voters that Curtis was a democrat, voters did see him as being less-republican than
Clark, which suggests that Clark's mailers did have an effect on the voters' view of
Curtis' party identification. A comparison of means test was conducted to see if this
difference in candidate party identification was significant. These results can be seen
in Table 2 (Appendix 1). The test statistic was -10.41, which means the difference in
party identification was significant at the 95 percent level.
Table 3 (Appendix A) shows the percentages of voters who were contacted by
only Curtis, only Clark, both of them, or neither of them. This table .shows both candidates contacted 53.8 percent of the voters combined. Overall though, Curtis contacted
more voters than Clark. While Clark's campaign was successful at painting Curtis to
be less republican, it is plausible that Curtis won because he simply reached a higher
number of voters than Clark.
The responses for campaign contacts were calculated and are seen in Table 4 (Appendix 1). This table contains the percentage of respondents who were contacted in
each of the nine categories. These percentages were calculated out of the 929 voters
who responded to the question. This table shows Curtis contacted a higher percentage of the voters than Clark in every category except for blogs. This is supported by
the campaign expenditures of the candidates where Curtis spent about $90,000 and
Clark only spent about $36,000 (Provo City web site). It follows that Curtis would
contact more by spending more.
For those voters who received mail from both Clark and Curtis, Curtis limited
the effectiveness of Clark's efforts to frame the election in partisan terms. Figure 1
(Appendix 2), which is a frequency distribution of candidate party identification,
substantiates this claim. This figure shows a plurality of voters did not see a difference between the party identification of Clark and Curtis. A response of no difference
would be zero on the negative six to positive six party identification scale.
In order to explain which campaign contacts had the biggest effects on voter perceptions, we ran four different models utilizing various measurements of campaign
effects on the dependent variable, difference in party identification. The results of
these four models may be seen in Table 5 (AppendiX 1).
The first model included whether or not the voter received a letter from Clark
explaining Curtis' ties with democrats and whether or not they received a letter from
Curtis countering Clark's claims. We recognize that we do not know which specific
mailer(s) the individual voters received from either candidate, but we assume the
voters who received mail most likely received multiple mailers, at least one of which
framed Curtis as a democrat. This model reveals that those who received a letter from
Curtis thought Curtis was more republican. Conversely, those who received a letter
from Clark thought Clark was more republican. This is evidenced by the negative
coefficient for a letter from Curtis and a positive coefficient for a letter from Clark.
Additionally, both of these variables are significant at the 99 percent level. This pro14
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vides evidence that Clark's campaign was successful at making Curtis appear less of
a republican and that Curtis' campaign was successful at countering Clark's claims.
It is important to note that the coefficient for the letter from Clark is larger than the
coefficient for the letter from Curtis, because it suggests Clark's letter had a more
substantive difference in affecting voters' perceptions of his party identification than
Curtis' letter.
The second model consists of all nine campaign contact categories for each candidate, where the first model only looked at the letters sent by the candidates. The
coefficients are still significant and still in the same direction, but they are smaller in
magnitude than the coefficients in Modell. When all campaign contacts are included
in the model, the impact of each campaign on party identification decreases but is still
significant. This could be because the content of the other campaign contacts did not
concern party identification but could have been about other issues.
The third model contains the difference between the total campaign contacts of
Clark and the total campaign contacts of Curtis. This variable's coefficient was significant and positive. This suggests that in total, Clark's campaign was better at influencing candidate party identification than that of Curtis, despite Curtis contacting a
significantly larger percentage of voters.
The fourth model is the most complete, because it controls for the voters who
received mail from both candidates (which was the largest percentage of voters). This
makes it easy to analyze which campaign had greater impact on shaping voters perception of the candidates' party identification. Including whether or not voters received mail from both candidates resulted in Curtis' coefficient becoming larger than
Clark's. This is noteworthy, because in the first model excluding the "both mail" variable, the coefficient for the letter from Clark was larger than the letter for Curtis. This
means ultimately the Curtis campaign successfully counteracted Clark's effort to tum
the election partisan. Both letter coefficients for Clark and Curtis were still significant.
Also, the "both mail" variable was not significant. This indicates voters who received
letters from both candidates did not see a difference in their party identification. This
explains why Curtis won in such a conservative city despite Clark's efforts to paint
him as a democrat, The r-squared values for the first three models were very low, the
highest being 0.10. The r-squared value for the fourth model was 0.57. This large increase provides evidence that the fourth model is the best at explaining the difference
in party identification between Clark and Curtis.

Limitations
The nature of nonpartisan elections limits how much we can generalize. A major
theme of this paper is that candidate campaigns can have a huge impact on the level
of partisanship in these types of elections. Additionally, a candidate's personal and
political history can have a huge impact on nonpartisan elections. Also, the presence
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of divisive issues where differences in political ideology are noticeable could affect
whether or not nonpartisan elections really are nonpartisan. While we are confident
about the Provo City mayoral election, it would be impossible to use these results to
predict other nonpartisan elections, because there is too much variation in unobservable characteristics between cities.
Our study of the Provo City election gave us the ability to see the power of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections given the homogenous demographics of both
the candidates and the electorate. While the homogeneity worked to our advantage
in this case study, it also makes it difficult to apply our findings to ~ther, more heterogeneous cities. Individual voters will react differently to campaign effects. For example, republicans and democrats might react differently to campaign effects, the effect
of which was immeasurable in Provo due to the small presence of democrats. Gender,
race, socioeconomic status, and education might also affect the voters' vulnerability
to campaign effects. Further research on campaign effects in nonpartisan elections
should be done in varying locations to take into account these considerations.

Conclusion
Both Clark and Curtis ran successful campaigns. Both influenced voters' decisions on Election Day through campaign effects. Clark was successful at framing Curtis as a democrat, but Curtis was more successful at counteracting Clark's attacks,
and, thus, won the election. Curtis not only successfully counteracted his opponent's
attacks, he clearly won the campaign contact battle, which likely contributed to his
election victory.
The study of campaign effects in nonpartisan elections should be an area of
continued research. Our research has focused specifically on the effect campaigns
have on shaping the voters' view of party identification in a nonpartisan race. Nonpartisan elections were originally established to remove party identification from
the candidates in order to focus the election on "who the best man for the job is"
(Schaffner et. al 2001). As long as voters refuse to research each candidate and the
issues, they will be easily swayed by low-cost cues typically sourcing from campaign efforts. Further research of the role party identification of candidates plays in
nonpartisan elections would provide evidence for the continued use of nonpartisan
elections or to their demise.
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Appendixl
Table 1
Voter Party ID
Strong Democrat

Percent
4.93

2

1.21

3

7.83

Independent

14.10

5

24.36

6

13.02

Strong Republican

34.55

Table 2: Candidate Party ID Summary question.

* Answers of 0 (no response), 8, 9 (prefer not to say, don't know) were

all dropped from the Party ID

Table 3: Who contacted Whom
Clark
Curtis

No Contact

Contact

Total

No Contact

2

6.

32

Contact

14.2

5

68

Total

39.4

60.6

100
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Table 4: Campaign Contacts
CampO:llgn AlIccls

Clark

CurtIs

Personal Contact

21.42

25.51

Contact by a Campaigner

23.57

30.89

Flyer at House

60.50

72.55

Mail

60.60

68.03

Church Friends/ Activities

23.25

24.54

Email

9.47

11.30

Blogs

10.33

8.40

Neighbor Contact

24.33

25.94

News/Magazine

24.87

27.34

These values are given as percentages.

Table 5: OLS Models
Depcndl'nt Vanablc: Dltfcrcncc
Regressor

111

Party ID (6 to-6

1

2

3

-l

Curtis Letter

-0.72**
(0.21)

-0.93**
(0.27)

Clark Letter

1.12**
(0.19)

0.72*
(0.37)

Curtis Campaign Contacts

-0.18**
(0.04)

Clark Campaign Contacts

0.32**
(0.04)

Difference in Candidate Campaign Contacts

0.26**
(0.03)

Mail from Both Candidates

0.56
(0.43)

Intercept
RA2

0.63**
(0.16)

0.52**
(0.15)

0.92**
(0.08)

0.72**
0.17

0.05

0.10

0.09

0.57

Standard errors are given in parentheses under coefficients, Individual coefficients are
statistically Significant at the *5% level or **1% level.

18

KELLY and HOLMES

Appendix 2
Graph 1
Difference in Candidate Party 10

Graph 2
Difference in Campaign
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Appendix 3
Figure 1: Voter Party Identification

[Q] Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a(n)
10 Strong Democrat
2(J Not so strong Democrat
3(J Independent leaning Democrat

40 Independent
5(J Independent leaning Republican
c(J Not so strong Republican

70 Strong Republican
8(J Other
Q(J Don't know

Figure 2: Candidate Party Identification

[0] On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1ls a strong Democrat and 715
a strong Republican, where would you place each of the
following people? Circle one number for each line.
Strong
strong
Republican
DelTlOCf8t
Independent
T
T
T

a. Governor H8fbert

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

b. Senator Bennett

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

c. John Curtis
d. Steve Cieri<

1

3

4

5

7

1

3

4

5

6
6

7

Figure 3: Campaign Effects
l.J J Candidates contact voters In many ways. Please mark the
ways In which you have had contact with Steve Clark and
.John Curtis or their campaigns.
Steve
John
C lark
Curtis

'0

a. Personal Contact

to
to

'0
'0
'0
'0

e. Church Friends/Activities

to

h. NeIghbor Contact
I.N

'0

20

20
"0
20
20
20
"0
"0
20
20
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Appendix 4
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Cash, Schools, and Immigrants: The
Effects of Income and Education on
Xenophobia in South Africa
John David Clark

Introduction
Ethnic tension has long been a part of South Africa's history, most prominently
with racial segregation during the apartheid years. In 1994, white minority rule was
replaced with black majority rule, and the years following the breakup of apartheid
saw a decrease in tensions between whites and other South Africans. However, despite this easing of tensions, problems still persist and a new trend in recent years
has been violence against immigrants from other African countries, perpetrated by
black South Africans. This problem is troubling and poses serious implications for
the future of a multiethnic and democratic state like South Africa. Some of the more
prominent reprisals against immigrants have been recent attacks in squatter camps
in May 2008. These were carried out by local residents against immigrants. Another
recent example has been government action used to "clean up" before the FIFA
World Cup. The government paid local residents to forcibly evict immigrant squatters. These eviction squads were nicknamed "red ants" because of the bright red
overalls and helmets the government uniformed them with. One red ant said, "It's
our land and we have the right to help the authorities move them. If the municipality
asks us to destroy these cockroaches then we'll do that and flatten their homes to
dust" (Sunday Times 2010). Statements like these sound all too similar to those used in
justifying Rwanda's genocide and seem ominous for South Africa.
This study attempts to answer the question of what effect income and education
have on xenophobia. Although measuring education and income levels is relatively
straightforward, one of the major problems with measuring xenophobia is that few
people are willing to admit xenophobic tendencies. This problem is especially com25
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pounded in a place like South Africa, where the last decade and a half has been
devoted to the idea of ethnic integration and creating a "rainbow nation." South Africans deal with racial discourses on an almost daily basis and, therefore, have a good
idea of what society expects in relation to other races. In such a setting, traditional
surveys are certainly inadequate. One recent innovation in measuring attitudes on
sensitive topics is the list experiment. This appears to participants to be a short survey
asking them to tell the number of items that make them angry or that they do not like,
etc. (note, it does not ask which items). In reality, the trick is that the treatment survey
has one additional item, an item that appears to fit with the others on the list. Any
difference between the mean number of items in the control and treatment groups
is attributed to the extra question. The list format appears to promise participants
anonymity and privacy, since they surmise, correctly, that researchers cannot identify
which specific items make subjects angry. However, the average difference between
groups produces an average treatment effect of adding the extra item.
Data was collected in three townships in South Africa during the summer of
2009. The areas in question are all relatively poor, most residents only finished secondary schooling, and many have only a few years of formal education. The survey
consisted of the list experiment and several background questions. In this study, I
look at the answers to the various list experiments and see how they relate to income and education levels. There were two questions, each with two treatments. The
various questions and treatments dealt with xenophobia in general, as well as how
it can influence elections. Some of the questions also deal with the ethnicity of South
African presidential candidates but can also provide insights into xenophobia against
non-South African ethnicities, since these questions also deal with racial attitudes.
After comparing high and low income and education, the results indicate that income and education had no effect on the xenophobic attitudes of the people in these
townships. These results were statistically significant, at the 95 percent and 99 percent
levels in many cases. This lack of education or income effects could be because the education and income levels are still too low to have an effect, or it could mean that income
and education are not as effective in decreasing xenophobia as would be hoped for. It
could also imply the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia are more
complex and need to be studied more thoroughly in future research.

Literature Review
There are many arguments as to what causes xenophobia and anti-immigrant
tension. Although I will only discuss income and education in depth, I will list other
arguments and explanations. These include scapegoating (see Johnson 1996, 111; Citrin et al. 1997; and Noyes 2019), the influence of populists and demagogues (see
Rydgren 2003; Collier 2003: 58-9; Crush 2000; and Ransford and McDonald 2001),
resource scarcity from which I base one of my explanations), and in the specific case
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of South Africa, a "culture of violence" (see BBC Online 2002; and UNODC 2010)
Although these may matter in explaining xenophobia, I will focus on the potential
impact of income and education.
There are two broad arguments for why people with lower education or lower income oppose immigration. The first is resource scarcity and the second is a cultural effect. The logic behind a resource scarcity is that if immigrants come into a labor market
with limited jobs, then they can significantly increase competition for employment, and
see locals as a the cause of unemployment and other social problems. The logic behind
a cultural effect is that as people become more educated, they tend to be more accepting of other ethnicities and backgrounds. They would be less likely to react violently
or resort to xenophobic attitudes. I will first discuss literature on the resource scarcity
model and then briefly discuss some research on the cultural argument.
One of the most common explanations for animosity toward immigrants is that
immigration increases competition for resources by creating resource scarcity. There
are several researchers who have shown resource scarcity is a large contributor to
xenophobic tensions. Percival and Homer-Dixon argue that certain resource scarcities in South Africa have played a role in increasing violence (1998), and Fisman and
Miguel also show how the shrinking of Lake Chad has led to more conflict in that region. In fact, other regions experiencing similar shrinking of resources have also had
up to a 30 percent greater chance of conflict (2008,111-35). Although these have less
to do with increased resource scarcity due to immigration, they still explain a similar
phenomenon: more incoming immigrants potentially strain resource and job supplies
and, therefore, cause more ethnic tension.
In the case of resource scarcity as it relates to jobs, it seems plausible that immigration into South Africa could possibly put a strain on job markets. Most African immigrants coming into South Africa are fleeing bad economic conditions in poorer parts
of Africa, such as neighboring Zimbabwe. Since many of the countries are poor and
less developed, few people coming from these countries are highly skilled. Even those
with good skills are sometimes not given good jobs and so have to work in low skill
positions (see Guardian 2010). In short, the immigrants in South Africa tend to be low
skill workers. What is more, because of their desperate situations, they are often more
willing than South"Africans to work for low wages. This leads to the conclusion that
the people who are most likely to dislike immigrants would be those with low skills or
low income; in other words, the people with whom immigrants are competing. In such
cases, a debate arises about who has a right to public goods (Wimmer 1997). When there
are fewer resources, locals become the judges of who can enjoy resources and who cannot. And often that means immigrants will be excluded or abused.
Much research has supported this idea. Alan Kessler argues there is a robust
relationship between lower income and education and xenophobia. Those people on
the lower spectrum of income and education tended to oppose immigration (2001).
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Eugene Campbell did a survey in Botswana asking natives their attitudes about immigrants (2003). He found that economic factors and nationalism both influenced
peoples' attitudes about immigrants. As Campbell puts it, "There is a strong desire
to preserve the 'fruits' of economic prosperity for citizens alone" (2003, 71). This
supports the income argument: those with more income are probably less worried
about losing the "fruits" of the country, since they have enough material benefits of
their own. Interestingly enough, the survey also revealed whites were favored over
other races and blacks were favored over Asians, especially Indians. Also supporting
this theory, Anna Maria Mayda did a cross country analysis looking at how skill levels correlate to attitudes on immigration (2006). She found people with lower skill
levels were generally more opposed to immigration. This also supports the resourcescarcity argument, since those persons with higher skills are often more able to find
jobs. As a counter argument to these explanations, some have argued that people
with more education are not necessarily less xenophobic, they are simply better at
giving more socially desirable answers (see Ostapczuk et al. 2009). However, Ostapczuk and his colleagues used a randomized response test with a lie detector and
found people with more education still tended to have less xenophobic attitudes than
those with lower education levels (2009).
There is also the argument that improved education and income will lead people
to be more open-minded and, therefore, willing to accept immigrants or other races.
There is less political science or economic research on this topic, but I will mention
some of the related literature. Hjerm has observed that Swedish youth who are better
educated tend to participate in democratic processes more, whereas those who are
less educated tend to resort to more violent measures and are, ultimately, more xenophobic (2005). Hainmueller and Hiscox strengthen this argument by showing Europeans with higher education levels are more open to the idea of immigration, regardless of whether they are unemployed or not, thus weakening the resource scarcity
(or labor competition) argument (2007). They say this indicates cultural norms have
a greater influence than economic incentives and education has tempering effects.
Although these analyses of xenophobia give us a general idea of some of the
attitudes and causes of xenophobia, they have two major problems. First of all, they
rely on methods that still fail to get an accurate measure of how people really feel.
In other words, they mostly rely on expressed preferences, which are not necessarily
the same as actual preferences. Even those methods that use something more still
have some problems, like the randomized response test with a lie detector. They try
to overcome some of the problems inherent in asking sensitive questions but still rely
on participants consciously having to take external social norms into account. More
importantly, however, they fail to admit the situation is far more complex than this
and the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia has a complicated
history throughout the world--especially in South Africa.
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Theory and Hypotheses
The dependent variable is xenophobia. I define this as hatred, dislike, or strong
mistrust of foreigners. The two independent variables are income and education. Income is money earned by a household, and education is years of schooling and types
of education (such as secondary school or university). Education is a more problematic variable because of varying levels of educational quality in South Africa. The
quality can be particularly low in townships such as the ones examined in this study
(see for example Fiske and Ladd 2004). However, in these cases, studies have shown
that job prospects for township residents can even be helped by low levels of education. Fryer and Vencatachellum show how women in a South African township,
Machibisa, have better job prospects even if they only have two years of secondary
school education. This implies that even if education quality in these areas is low,
education is still important and can influence job opportunities.
The four hypotheses I will focus on are:
1) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of decreased "resource scarcity." This means those persons with low levels of income
or education have to compete for scarce jobs or resources more than richer or
more educated people do.
2) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of a "cultural effect;" education makes people more open and tolerant of other ethnicities
so they are less likely to be antagonistic to others.
3) Increased income and education will not decrease xenophobia because the
relationship between the variables is too complex.
4) If income and education levels are too low, then they will not decrease
xenophobia

Methodology
Experiments
Since this study relies on quantitative data from a field experiment, I will briefly
discuss my reason for using experiments. In recent years, there has been an increase
in the social sciences of using experiments as a way to more accurately measure
causality. The debate about their effectiveness is extensive and some researchers
still strongly oppose them as a valid means of determining causality, while others
see them as a vital key in political science and economic research (see for example
Deaton 2009; Duflo et al. 2007). Although this debate is too extensive to cover here, I
will cover the most important points in order to justify my use of experimental data.
The biggest criticism is that experiments are not externally valid. There is some
legitimacy to this, yet just because they are not 100 percent externally valid does not
mean we should not make use of the insights we can gain from them. Well-designed
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experiments can provide powerful insights into why people behave in certain ways,
given certain circumstances. In other words, they give us a way to control all other
factors and focus on causality, something that observational data cannot do. Experiments are really a practical application of ceteris paribus, a fundamental assumption
in many disciplines. This assumption simplifies the tangle of data and potential
causal variables and can help provide understanding that would be unavailable
otherwise. I do not argue that the one approach is more important than the other
but rather that both experiments and observational data have their place in social
science research.

List Experiments
This study makes use of a relatively new tool: the list experiment. Because of
the potentially sensitive nature of some survey questions, respondents might not be
completely truthful (see Janus 2007). Even if anonymity is presumably guaranteed,
many respondents might have a desire to conceal their actual feelings. And those
persons who do not deliberately try to cover their true attitudes are often conditioned
to know what answers are socially acceptable or not, and perhaps do not even realize their own true feelings about other ethnicities. In other words, people often think
that they fit with societal rules even when they do not. In these cases, an unobtrusive
method is needed to get true answers to sensitive questions. In South Africa, where
the last five years have seen attempts at building a cohesive, multicultural society,
and where racial prejudice is certainly frowned upon, people might have even more
incentive to hide xenophobic attitudes, or try to convince themselves they are not really xenophobic. A setting like this makes it especially important to use unobtrusive
methods to ascertain racial attitudes.
The list experiment is a simple survey with two versions. In the control, participants are asked how many of the following make them angry (or asked how
many of the items they do regularly, etc.). In this example, all of the things on the
list are reasonable options for making someone angry. In the treatment, the rest of
the participants also receive a survey, but this time with one additional item, which
embodies the outcome of interest. Because the treatment group does not know their
questionnaire is different from the control group (which also makes it especially
important that participants do not see other people's questions), and because they
are only asked to say how many items, not which specific items, they assume their
answers are not particularly revealing. Further, because the items all seem like reasonable options to make people angry, the treatment is unobtrusive. However, by
doing a difference of means test between the two groups, we are able to see if the
treatment list, and particularly the treatment item, provokes a higher mean number
from treatment subjects vs. control subjects. If it does, then we can attribute the difference to the treatment.
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Here is an example of one of the lists that was used (Noyes 2009):
Table 1: Example of List Experiment: How many of the following make you angry?
Treatment

Control
Politicians who do not keep their promises

Politicians who do not keep their promises

The unemployment rate

The unemployment rate

High prices (for example: food and gas
prices)

High prices (for example: food and gas
prices)

High crime rates

High crime rates
Immigrants moving into your community

There were two list questions, each with two different treatments, meaning that
each participant got one of four options, or a control. The first list asked "How many
of the following make you angry?" The second question was "How many of the following influenced your vote in the recent presidential elections?" Each list also had
either a specifically anti-immigrant xenophobia question, or a question relating to the
recent election in 2009. Here are all four treatments used in the two list experiments
(Noyes 2010):
Table 2: Questions and Treatments
List
List 1
How many of the following
make you angry?
List 2
How many of the
following influenced
your vote in the recent
presidential elections?

Xenophobia treatment

Election treatment

(Treatment 1-1)

(Treatment 1-2)

Immigrants moving
into your community

Having a president who is not of
the same tribal ethnicity

(Treatment 2-1)

(Treatment 2-2)

Promises made by
candidates or parties
to take measures to
counter immigration

Ethnicity of candidate

Experiment Design
The data was collected by Ken Noyes, in the summer of 2009, as part of his
research on the effects of ethnicity on xenophobia (see Noyes 2009). I am using his
data set to look at the effects of education and income, variables he did not look at.
The subjects in the study all come from three townships (slum-like settlements in
South Africa): Davy ton, close to Johannesburg; Mdantsane, near East London; and
Umlazi, situated near Durban. These townships were chosen because they seem to
be a good representation of ethnicities in South Africa (excluding whites), in the
hopes of getting a rough map of overall South African attitudes. Umlazi is mainly
a Zulu township, Mdantsane is mainly Xhosa, and Davyton is a relatively good
representation of all the other South African ethnicities (Noyes 2009). The other
ethnicities are Swati, Ndebele, Sotho, Pedi, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda (Britannica
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2010). All nine of these major ethnic groups make up the majority of South African
blacks, with Zulu and Xhosa being the dominant groups. Of course, a completely
ideal survey would have chosen randomly from different places in South Africa,
in the hopes of getting a truly accurate distribution of observations. However, this
data ostensibly still gives a more-or-Iess accurate depiction of what black South
Africans feel when it comes to xenophobia. Since this was the first such experiment
in South Africa, it is not meant as an exhaustive survey but rather an attempt to get
an idea of xenophobia in South Africa.
The data was collected by local university students familiar with the area. Zones
were randomly chosen, as were routes and starting houses in these zones. The recruiters went at various assigned times to every third door and randomly chose an adult
candidate for participation. They were then offered the opportunity to participate in
a study about South Africa's ethnic groups, and to receive 60 Rand (about $6). If the
person accepted, they were handed an invitation to go to a local school where the research would be carried out. The invitation had the person's name on it as well as the
time they were to come, to make sure the right person came to the study. When they
came to the study, they were instructed on how to use the basic computer program
and then did a survey about basic background information, as well as their responses
to the list experiments.
The background questions asked them about their ethnicity, party affiliation, predominant language, where they were born, where they live, and information about
income and education (see Appendix). For education, people were offered increments
of schooling, which made a scale of one to seven, one being "no schooling" and seven
being "completed university or polytechnic" (see table 3). For income, people were
offered increments of annual earnings (see table 4). The lowest income was "R5,000
or less" (about $500), and the highest was "R90 467 and above" (about $9,000). To get
an idea of what purchasing power in South Africa is like, the rand-dollar exchange
rate at the time of the study was about R 10 to $1, and gas cost about R7 a liter in 2009,
which converted to about $0.70 a liter, or $2.66 per gallon ("Petrol Prices," Mail &
Guardian, 27 February 2009). Other examples include: two liters of milk R18 ($1.80),
jeans R150-250 ($15-25), movie ticket R20-50 ($2-5), and pizza R30-65 ($3--6.50)
(Monash University 2009).
Education and income levels were generally low but perhaps not as low as expected. The mean for education was 4.621, with 659 observations, a standard deviation
of 1.193, and minimum one and maximum seven (see Figure 1). The 4.621 mean implies
most people had either completed secondary school or had some secondary school.
As for income, the great majority of people fell into the lowest range, R5,OOO or
less. The mean was 1.935, with 650 observations, a standard deviation of 1.387, and
responses ranging from 1--6 (see figure 2).
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Figure 1: Level of schooling completed
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1: No schooling; 2: Some primary; 3: Completed primary school; 4:
Some secondary school; 5: Completed secondary school; 6: Some university or polytechnic; 7: Completed university or polytechnic

Figure 2: Yearly Household Income
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1: RS,OOO or less; 2: RS,001-11,378; 3: Rll,379-20,202; 4: R20,20~,402;

5: RJ:!j,043-90,466; 6: R90,467 and above

Results
The control and treatment results for income were obtained by dividing all responses into high income and low income, each group making up about half of the
responses. I labeled those with income of "one" as low income and all the others as
high income in order to evenly split the data. Otherwise, there were too few observations in "high income." Even with this divide, there were still slightly more people in
the low-income group. I then took all people who answered the control and were high
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income and combined them into a variable called "control high income." I then took
all the high-income people who answered the treatment and made them a variable
called "treatment high income." I conducted comparison of the means test, to see if
there was a difference between the control and treatment high income groups. The
next step was to take the low-income control and low-income treatment and compare
them. To see if there is a difference between high income and low income, I looked
at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals. If there was no overlap, I concluded there was a significant difference between high and low income. If they did
overlap, then there was no significant difference.
For education, I also divided the data, as evenly as possible, into high and low
income. I made levels one through four low education and five through seven high
education. This was also done to evenly split the data so high education was not too
small. Since there were such a large number in five (completed secondary school), the
high education group is slightly larger, as can be seen in the data. I then did the same
for income so I had variables for those that answered the control and had high or low
education, and then the same for those who answered the treatment.

Income
Treatment 1-1
Variable

High
Income
Low
Income

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

2.654
(0.118)

81

3.654
(0.138)

91

-0.609
(0.184)

2.618
(0.108)

110

3.356
(0.124)

118

-0.734
(0.165)

95% CI

90%CI

-0.972

-0.912

to

to

-0.247

-0.306

-1.063

-1.001

to

to

-0.412

-0.463

T
Value
-3.317

-4.467

The survey for this question was the first list experiment, which asked how
many of the following makes you angry. The first treatment, the one this table is
about, was "Immigrants moving into your community." Although there is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment, as can be seen by
the strong t-values, when comparing high and low income there is little difference.
The 95 percent confidence interval for high income is -0.972 to -0.247 and for low
income it is -1.063 to -0.412. Although low income has a slightly larger difference, the
confidence intervals still overlap, which means there is no statistical difference. In
other words, all we can tell from this data is there is xenophobia against immigrants,
but high- or low-income people are not any more prone to be xenophobic. Even with
90 percent confidence intervals, and at the risk of committing Type I error, there is
still not enough statistical difference. In other words, at the 95 percent and 90 percent
levels, there is no statistical difference.
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Treatment 1-2
Variable

Control
Mean

High
Income

2.654
(0.118)

Low
Income

2.618
(0.108)

N
81

110

Treatment
Mean
3.061
(0.133)

3.349
(0.123)

N
97

106

Difference

95%CI

90%CI

T
Value

-00407

-0.764

-0.706

-2.254

(0.181)

to

to

-0.247

-0.108

-1.053

-1.001

-0.731
(0.163)

to

to

-0.409

..().461

-4.476

The question for this treatment, in response to being asked how many of the following make you angry, was "Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity
as you are." Once again, although there is a difference from the control in both cases,
there is no difference between high and low. The 95 percent CI for high income goes
from 0.764 to -0.247 and for low income it goes from -1.053 to -0.409. Since there is
overlap here, we can infer there is no difference between high and low income. The
same goes for the 90 percent CI: once again, there is still quite a large overlap. Therefore, we can say, at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence levels, there is no difference between high and low income in influencing xenophobic attitudes. In short, the
only thing we know yet is that xenophobia exists against immigrants and high or low
income is not an influencing factor.
Treatment 2-1
Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

High
Income

3.265
(0.113)

92

3.524
(0.144)

86

-0.258
(0.182)

Low
Income

2.927
(0.109)

110

3.214
(0.136)

126

Variable

-0.287
(0.178)

95%CI

90%CI

-0.617

-0.557

to

to

0.101

0.041

-0.637

-0.580

to

to

0.063

0.006

T
Value
-1.420

-1.614

These are the results from the second list of questions, where participants were asked
how many of the following influenced their voting in the most recent elections, held
in 2009. The treatment for this list was "Promises made by candidates or parties to
take measures to counter immigration." In this case, there is not a statistical difference
between the treatment and the control, which means this was probably not a significant enough issue for these people in this election. In addition, there is no difference
between high and low income, at the 90 percent or at the 95 percent significance levels.
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Treatment 2-2
Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

High
Income

3.265
(0.113)

92

3.253
(0.132)

87

0.012
(0.173)

-0.329

-0.273

to 0.354

to 0.297

Low
Income

2.927
(0.108)

110

3.494
(0.144)

102

-0.494
(0.179)

-0.846

to
-0.146

90%CI

T
Value
0.071

-0.788

to

-2.769

-0.200

This is also from the second list of questions, i.e., the question of how many of these
factors influenced your vote in the most recent election, and the question for the treatment in this one was "Ethnicity of candidate." Once again, the results are not statistically significant, in other words, ethnicity of the candidate did not playa major role
for most of these people. Further, there is no difference between high income and low
income, neither at the 90 percent level or the 95 percent significance levels.
Education
Treatment 1-1
Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

High
Education

2.778
(0.096)

117

3.283
(0.116)

127

-0.506
(0.152)

Low
Education

2.405
(0.135)

74

3.366
(0.152)

82

-0.960
(0.205)

95%

CI
-0.805

90% CI

T
Value

-0.756

to

to

-0.206

-0.256

-1.365

-1.297

to

to

-0.556

-0.6227

-3.329

-4.693

These data are once again from the first list experiment, where the question was
"How many of the following make you angry," and where this particular treatment
is "Immigrants moving into your community." Instead of being divided by income,
the divide is by education, where the low-education group is represented from levels
one to four and the high-education group in levels five to seven. In this case, there
is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment means,
for both high and low education, implying that immigration makes both groups upset. However, the confidence intervals for high and low both overlap, so we can infer there is no difference between high and low education in mitigating xenophobia
against immigrants.

36

CLARK
Treatment 1-2

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
N
Mean

Difference 95%CI

90%CI

TValue

2.778
High
Education (0.096)

117

3.264
(0.113)

121

-0.487
(0.149)

-0.780 to
-0.193

-0.732 to
-0.2418

-3.266

Low
2.405
Education (0.135)

74

3.134
(0.150)

82

-0.729
(0.203)

-1.130 to
-0.327

-1.063 to
-0.395

-3.586

This is also in response to the question of how many of the following make you angry, and the specific treatment is "Having a president who is not of the same tribal
ethnicity." There is a difference between the treatment and the mean, but there is no
difference between the CIs of high and low education, meaning high education and
low education do not make a difference in influencing xenophobia.
Treatment 2-1

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

90%CI

TValue

High
Education

3.176
(0.098)

127

3.456
(0.127)

125

-0.280
(0.160)

-0.595 to
0.036

-0.543 to
-0.017

-1.745

Low
Education

2.920
(0.133)

75

3.172
(0.161)

87

-0.252
(0.213)

-0.673 to
0.168

-0.602 to
0.098

-1.185

These data come from the second list experiment, asking "How many of the following influenced your vote in the last election." The treatment is "Promises made by
candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration." As in all the previous
examples, there is no difference between high and low education, and the results are
also not particularly statistically significant either.
Treatment 2-2

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

90% CI

TValue

High
Education

3.176
(0.098)

127

3.439
(0.130)

107

-0.263
(0.160)

-0.578 to
0.052

-0.526 to
0.0002

-1.646

Low
Education

2.929
(0.133)

75

3.220
(0.151)

82

-0.300
(0.203)

-0.700 to
0.101

-0.634 to
0.034

-1.477

These data ask how many of the factors on the list influenced your vote with the treatment of "Ethnicity of candidate." In this case, there is little difference between control
and mean, and there is also no difference between high education and low education.

Discussion and Implications
In short, the results show that education and income were not significant predictors of xenophobia. This could have varying implications. First, it could mean levels
of income and education in this study were too low to show any difference. This
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might have been the case since many of the people had only a secondary school education. Perhaps education only has effects after much higher levels, like a university
degree. Secondary school does not open up a lot of job opportunities, so these people
would tend to be low-skill workers. But, as already indicated by the Fryer and Vencatachellum study, even low levels of education can help people escape from greater
job vulnerability. Yet, there are still problems with such an explanation because even
high levels of education do not always lead to high job safety. This is especially true
of the outsourcing or off-shoring of jobs. At least in these cases, ~e people "stealing"
jobs are too far away to be attacked. But either way, high- and low-skill jobs are both
vulnerable to a certain degree.
As for the idea of certain stages of education being necessary to prevent xenophobia (secondary school diploma, college degree, etc.), we find some evidence. This
is seen in that many of the immigrants attacked have been low-skill workers, and so
it would be other low-skill workers from South Africa who were competing for the
same jobs. On the other hand, even high-skilled workers from other countries are
sometimes forced to work in low-skill jobs, because low-skill jobs are the only ones
that will accept them (Guardian 2010). Even in these cases of higher skills, legal and
illegal immigrants are perceived as a threat to low-skill jobs. However, as already explained before, this is still a problematic explanation, since many segregationist and
violently xenophobic systems in the past, such as apartheid, slavery, or racial persecution, have often been carried out by the richer and more educated.
This leads to the other hypothesis that education can make people more tolerant and open, and so less xenophobic. In this scenario, more "enlightened" people
would not engage in burning down the homes of immigrants, beating them, and
dispelling them from communities. Most people in the West, while normally more
educated and wealthy, were shocked when they saw the anti-immigrant violence
2008. Yet, it is exactly these countries that have carried out some of the most brutal
and harsh treatment of perceived "inferior" populations. Past sins aside, the West
is far from resolving all of its racial problems. Blacks in America are still less likely
to get jobs they are just as qualified for as white people (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and the prisons are still disproportionately full of African-Americans
(see Herbert 2010). And there is still the recent furor over the mosque and Islamic
center in Manhattan, where people objected to a mosque and Islamic cultural center
being built so close to ground zero (see Wright 2010). Such unwillingness shows
Americans are still not so comfortable with other races yet and still struggle to a
certain extent to trust the other.
Along these lines, Europe, another high-income and high-education area, is also
enmeshed in its own racial and xenophobic turmoil. Several European countries have
banned wearing hijabs and other religious covering. For an excellent look at some of
these arguments and why none of them are worthy of a liberal democratic tradition,
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such as Western Europe's, see Martha Nussbaum's article, "Veiled Threats?" (2010).
She goes through arguments used against the hijab and shows how they are double
standards-if these politicians really meant what they said, they would also ban high
heels, pornography, and liposuction, and not allow people to wear scarves in the
winter. In short, these seemingly neutral laws are badly disguised and hypocritical
attacks on Muslims. Further, in the Netherlands, when Theo van Gogh was killed
by a Muslim, there was massive outrage and a general feeling this was additional
evidence Muslims were dangerous and radical. Yet when Pim Fortuyn was murdered
the year before by an environmentalist, environmentalists were not seen as radical
extremists, and there was no banning of environmentalist movements or the likes.
As a final example, Switzerland, a supposedly free country, banned minarets on new
mosques, by popular referendum. This is even more disturbing, because it shows a
majority of the population, and not just some small group of politicians, were willing
to make a law that limited the rights of a small minority group. All of these cases demonstrate countries that are supposedly free and tolerant, not to mention educated and
wealthy, have many laws and attitudes that are xenophobic in nature. Therefore, even
though education might temper some people against xenophobia, such as education
about other people or places, it is still not a universal guarantor against xenophobia
and does not automatically improve interracial relations all of the time or even necessarily most of the time. Therefore, these results are further evidence that income and
education are inherently complex variables when it comes to solving ethnic tensions
and xenophobic violence.

Limitations, External Validity, and Further Research
Although these results are intriguing, this study is limited in various ways. For
one, the data is not exhaustive, it only shows three townships. Although the townships were selected by the original researchers in an effort to get a representation of
all South African black ethnicities, they are still a small observation on the total demographics of South Africa. Further research would need to be done to fully ascertain
the extent of racial perceptions throughout South Africa. Furthermore, the data is limited, because it only shows one snapshot in time and does not really indicate trends
over time or trends'without external shocks, such as elections and their accompanying rhetoric, as was the case in this study set during the 2009 elections. Nevertheless,
it does provide an idea of racial attitudes and trends in South Africa today.
Perhaps this research can still be applied to the rest of South Africa. For one, the
fact there are so many townships like the ones in this study means such results probably hold true for a large number of South Africans. Whether or not this also applies
to the higher levels of South African society remains to be determined by further
research. As for external validity to other countries, few places have such a starkly
stratified society like South Africa's, where the education and income gaps were ex39
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acerbated by segregationist legislation. South Africa provides a fairly unique picture
of xenophobia. However, there are many ways the lessons learned in South Africa
can be applied elsewhere. Many other African countries have slums like the South
African townships; these results probably also apply for groups of people there. And
apart from Africa, there are many other places in the world that also have similar settings, so these conclusions might also apply there, too.
Further research would also need to be done using these types of surveys to see
which people from all sorts of backgrounds in South Africa are ~ore xenophobicnot just black people in slums. Perhaps such research would show people with college degrees are less likely to be xenophobic. In any case, the most logical step after
this research is to include all backgrounds. This would either strengthen the conclusion that higher education and income are actually not good at decreasing xenophobia, or perhaps weaken these conclusions. Both would have significant implications.

Conclusion
This paper has found varying evidence for the three hypotheses discussed earlier. There is some evidence for the resource scarcity explanation since it can be
argued that the education levels here are still too small to make a difference to show
people being able to escape significant job competition. Perhaps a greater threshold
of education would be needed to see significant decreases in xenophobia. On the
other hand, there is little evidence for the cultural explanation, because each year
of schooling would be expected to make people more educated and open, whereas
only certain levels of education will be any use for people looking for work. Each
added year would be expected to moderate people, since this is unrelated to job
availability. But finally, the most conclusive evidence from these tests is the whole
story is more complicated. Education and income did not seem to make people any
less xenophobic. This goes with the observation that much racial persecution over
time has been perpetrated by richer, more educated people. Therefore, the implications are not as straightforward as increasing education and income. Perhaps this
means education needs to be specifically geared toward decreasing anti-immigrant
xenophobia and not just focused on abstract ideas of liberal democratic values. Another implication is that immigrants need greater protection, since they are often
likely to be persecuted and be more vulnerable, no matter what the situation. Most
of all, we need to take a less simplistic approach to dealing with immigrants and
admit that any of us might be guilty of xenophobia-not just the people beating
immigrants in the streets.
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The Rise of the Chinese Navy: What
the World can Expect from Asia's
Emerging Maritime Power
David Gerard

As China accelerates its climb toward superpower status, the rhetoric of a "China
threat" is heard with increasing frequency throughout the world. In the past, this
rhetoric was based on China's intimidating economic growth. Yet, in recent years,
China-anxious nations have turned their focus to a "threat" with more palpable implications: the threat of military expansion. China's growing military power, specifically its naval power, is a source of growing anxiety for many in the international
community. Two of China's closest neighbors, Japan and South Korea, see China's
enlarged navy as the precursor to revisionist Chinese aggression (Page 2011). Others, like Southeast Asian countries, fear China will use its enhanced naval powers to
impose unequal resolutions on territorial disputes in the South China Sea (Washington
Post 2011). Even the U.S., a naval giant, sees the rise of the Chinese Navy as a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region (U.S. Library of Congress 2010, 33). But
are these concerns justified or has the world misread this latest maneuver in Chinese
foreign policy?
The purpose 6f this analysis is to identify the cause of China's recent naval expansion and predict future Chinese naval behavior. It begins by relating the breadth
and depth of China's naval improvements and reviews three prominent competing
explanations for this growth. Next, I predict future developments in specific foreign
policy issues, including China's dealings with Japan, South Korea, the South China
Sea, the U.s., and the projection of naval power abroad more generally. This article
posits that China's use of its newly improved navy is dependent on domestic considerations, namely, the level of domestic support for and the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party.
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The Extent of Chinese Naval Expansion
Since the year 2000, China's official military budget has experienced consistent,
rapid growth, increasing from 14.6 billion (USD) to its present day amount of 77.9 billion (USD) (Global Security). This increase has allowed the People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN), the naval service arm of the People's Liberation Army, to acquire
more naval assets abroad and simultaneously produce more naval assets at home.
According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, the PLAN has focused
its modernization efforts on the following key areas: anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, submarines, the development of an aircraft carrier, and the production of
surface combatants like frigates and destroyers (U.S. Library of Congress 2010, 2). The
growth in these areas has been substantial. The Office of Naval Intelligence reports
that from 1990 to 2009 the number of Chinese destroyers has increased by 37 percent,
frigates by 86 percent, and ballistic missile submarines by 200 percent. They also predict China will have at least one operational aircraft carrier by the year 2015 (U.S. Library of Congress 2010,19). To complement this growth in naval assets, the PLAN has
also sought to improve the education and training of naval officers, logistics management, and operational mobility (Chaffin 2010). The Chinese Navy is not only growing
in size but also in efficiency and expertise.
As intimidating as these numbers are, they might only represent a portion of
the actual growth in the Chinese Navy. Chinese reporting procedures are notorious
for their lack of transparency, and Western powers fear much of China's military
growth remains undisclosed or carefully disguised by the Chinese government's
accounting processes. In fact, in a recent New York Times article, American officials
expressed concern for China's "lack of openness about the growth" seen in the military (Shanker 2010). The possibility of undisclosed military spending is further evidenced by the discrepancy between publicly reported data figures, like the World
Bank's World Development Indicators, and intelligence-based estimations, like
those produced by the CIA. While the World Bank statistics reflect a fairly consistent 2 percent of China's annual GDP has been dedicated to military purposes since
1993, the CIA's 2006 estimate more than doubles that figure at 4.3 percent (World
Bank 2010). This estimate rivals the u.s: current military spending level of 4.06
percent; more importantly, it suggests over half of China's military expenditures are
unaccounted for in public reports.

Motivations for Expansion: Three Possibilities
While the scope and speed of China's impressive naval growth is undeniable,
the motivations driving this unprecedented growth are less concrete. Politicians,
analysts, and academics alike all struggle to convincingly explain this phenomenon
and to penetrate the black box of Chinese foreign policy making. From this ongoing
debate, three possible explanations for China's recent naval growth have emerged.
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The first of these three explanations, coined "naval nationalism" by the theory's main proponent Robert S. Ross, suggest China will "embark on a more ambitious maritime policy" in the pursuit of great power status (2009, 46). Ross bases
his analysis on geopolitics and the behavior of former land-based powers. As a land
based geo-polity, China is at a strategic disadvantage in naval endeavors; it lacks the
land security to fully invest in an effective power-projecting navy. Ross argues that
a motive outside of strategic interest is directing Chinese behavior. He claims this
ulterior motive is a "prestige strategy," in which China attempts to bolster domestic
legitimacy with impressive military feats abroad. Ross points out that merely upsetting the equilibrium of global naval power might constitute a considerable victory
for a prestige-seeking nation. Accordingly, China is pursuing an access-denial naval
strategy. If achieved, this strategy will shift naval power in the Asia-Pacific region
but cannot guarantee successful naval projection abroad. In sum, Ross claims it is
nationalism, rather than concerns for security, that explain China's recent investment
in military might.
Ross supports his argument with a detailed account of China's efforts to develop
aircraft carrier capabilities. Since the idea of a native-built aircraft carrier was first conceived in 1986, the issue of whether or not to build such a craft became an increasingly
public issue. Ross writes that support for an aircraft carrier became "mainstream" and
"spread to the provinces and to all sectors of Chinese society, including to universities,
government think tanks, industrial circles, the political elite, and the general public"
(2009,61). In turn, Ross argues, this potent nationalist sentiment dictates government
decision-making. Leaders must concede to overwhelming nationalist sentiments in order to maintain their legitimacy as vanguards of China's national interests.
A second possible explanation sees Chinese naval growth as an expected, unthreatening response to China's increased integration into the world economy.
Contrary to Ross, these scholars and analysts argue security concerns, rather than
nationalism, are the driving force behind Chinese naval expansion. This viewpoint
is expressed most clearly by Michael Glosny and Phillip Saunders in their formal
critique of Ross's naval nationalism theory. They cite China's growing interdependence on foreign trade and communication as sufficient motivation for heightened
attention on naval capabilities. They further insist Chinese naval build-up is narrowly
calculated to serve as a minimal deterrence against foreign aggression, especially in
sensitive issues of territorial sovereignty like Taiwan.
These scholars support their assertion with reference to the limited capabilities
of China's latest naval procurements. One advocate of this viewpoint, Greg Chaffin, notes that "China has focused on developing capabilities to control and respond
to contingencies in its own backyard" (n.d., 1). For example, China currently operates only five replenishment ships, hampering its ability to sustain long-term naval
campaigns. The Chinese also lack the necessary logistical expertise to conduct aerial
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operations on aircraft carriers (Chaffin n.d., 1). The nature of these procurements suggests China's naval growth is not designed to facilitate Chinese aggression but rather
protection. Glosny and Phillips add that China receives 86 percent of its imported oil
via ocean shipping, giving the Chinese strong incentives to develop a navy that can
guarantee access to sea lines of communication (2010, 163).
Xu Qi, a scholar and senior captain in the PLAN, offers a third possible explanation for Chinese naval expansion. Xu suggests Chinese naval growth is the result of
fortunate circumstance. In the past, China unwisely isolated itself .from the world because of its self-sufficient agriculture and Sino-centric worldview. However, in recent
years, the Chinese have experienced favorable conditions for maritime emphasis and
have responded accordingly. These conditions include China's growing economic
power, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the peaceful negotiation of land boundaries
(Qi 2006, 56). These developments grant China greater land security and expendable
resources. Thus, Xu claims, China is in an opportune situation to shift its time and
attention to maritime issues.

Analysis
The three aforementioned theories of Chinese naval expansion each enrich our
understanding of China's recent naval development. In different scenarios and to different degrees, elements from each of these explanations will be helpful in forecasting
Chinese behavior. Ross rightly recognizes the salience of China's growing nationalist
sentiment, Glosny and Saunders consider important economic and practical needs
for an enlarged navy, and Xu Qi provides an historical context with which to understand past Chinese actions. However, Ross identifies the most vital consideration for
calculating the implications of Chinese naval growth: the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). In fact, it is the legitimacy of the communist regime dictating the degree to which each of these theories will hold explanatory power in any
given foreign-policy scenario. For instance, the degree to which nationalism (Ross'
argument) or commercial and security concerns (Glosny and Saunders argument)
influence Chinese decision-making is dependent on how these outcomes influence
the CCP's overall legitimacy.
The Communist Party has three means of bolstering domestic legitimacy: 1)
fostering consistent economic growth, 2) ensuring domestic stability, and 3) maintaining their appearance as vanguards of the national interest. Assuming the CCP is
composed of rational, self-interested actors with a desire to remain in power, these
three criteria for legitimacy can be used to predict Chinese behavior in a wide array
of circumstances. The CCP will employ its new naval capabilities in situations that
enhance its overall legitimacy but will refrain from the use of naval force in situations
that damage their legitimacy. While I agree with Ross in identifying nationalism as
an important force behind China's recent naval modernization, I expand his theory
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to account for two other sources of legitimacy for the Communist Party. In turn, the
inclusion of these two sources explain how nationalism is not the only reason for Chinese naval expansion but rather an expression of the Chinese government's deepest
and most basic concern: legitimacy. Using this framework, one can predict Chinese
naval behavior in relation to Japan, South Korea, the South China Sea, the U.S., and
the international community as a whole.

Japan
Most contemporary foreign policy disputes between China and Japan can be
traced back to World War II. In 1935, the Japanese invaded the Chinese mainland and,
for a time, controlled much of northern China, Taiwan, former German concessions in
the Shandong Peninsula, and Hong Kong. The undeniable brutality of some of these
campaigns, like the Rape of Nanjing, left lasting scars in China's national memory
As a result, the Chinese possess an enduring skepticism toward the Japanese and are
hypersensitive to issues of territorial sovereignty.
In more recent history, these deep-seated feelings have reemerged and ignited
dispute in the waters dividing these two nations. This is most readily seen in the
ongoing dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While the islands are of questionable economic and strategic importance, they serve as a symbol of Japan's imperialist
past. The Chinese claim the islands were stripped from them in the early nineteenth
century and should have been returned at the close of the Second World War. This issue reignited in early September of this year, when the Japanese Coast Guard arrested
a belligerent Chinese fishing captain for ramming a Japanese vessel near the islands
(Johnson 2010).
Nonetheless, Chinese naval expansion will bring little change to the status quo
in Sino-Japanese relations, unless anti-Japanese sentiment in China incites domestic
instability. As a strategic trade partner, the Japanese serve an important role in providing the economic growth necessary for domestic legitimacy. In a May 2010 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao,
Wen admitted, "China and Japan have very close economic and trade ties. One could
say they are at the point where neither could do without the other" (Nishikawa and
Buckley 2011). Upsetting relations and risking broken commercial ties would substantially injure the Chinese economy and the CCP's reputation at home. However,
since Japan-related, foreign-policy issues are closely associated with China's national
identity, a surge in public anti-Japanese sentiment might alter CCP calculations. In
the past, issues as mundane as Japanese textbook content have incited rioting in the
Chinese mainland (Weiss 2008). If similar domestic unrest results from the Senkaku/
Diaoyu issue, the party would suffer damaged legitimacy in terms of both internal
stability and as vanguards of China's national interest. In such a circumstance, the
Chinese would likely use naval force to challenge ownership of the islands.
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South Korea
Similar to Japan, many of South Korea's maritime disputes with China are rooted
in history. China's close relationship with the North Korean regime has bred skepticism in both the Chinese and South Korean camps. Furthermore, as with Japan, this
closely ties any South Korean dispute to China's national identity and pride. At present, the most prominent expression of Sino-South Korean maritime disagreement is
the territorial status of the Yellow Sea. In summer 2010, Chinese officials disapproved
of the U.S: intentions to conduct joint naval exercises with South Korea in the area
(Sima n.d., 1). China claims a soft suzerainty in the Yellow Sea due to its arguably
bay-like features and proximity to strategic Chinese cities.
Given the similarities between Japan and South Korea, both in close geographic location with China, Chinese naval behavior toward Korea will likely resemble China's
behavior toward Japan. The communist regime understands the loss of an important
economic partner is more detrimental to their legitimacy at home than any legitimacy
gained in a crusade of national interest. In his comments on the recent Yellow Sea
squabble, Major General Yin Zhuo of the PLA affirmed, "The peace and stability of
the Korean peninsula is important to peace in China and to China's economic development, hence we advocate maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula" (Sima
n.d., 1). However, these calculations could be overturned if a South Korean maritime
dispute ever incited drastic domestic instability within China.

The South China Sea
China's territorial claim to islands in the South China Sea predates the founding
of the People's Republic of China. Early Republic of China maps contain generous,
inclusive boundaries of Chinese sovereignty that dip deep into the South China Sea.
China justifies its ambitious assertions with ancient documents claiming original discovery of the islands. Today, ownership of the islands in this area is heavily contested.
Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Malaysia all lay claim to
some portion of this island speckled region with varying legal justifications. Of these
islands, the Spratly and Paracel chains are of particular concern because of their
newly discovered offshore oil and natural gas deposits.
The possibility of Chinese naval intervention to solve the South China Sea disputes is not a novel idea. In 1988, the Chinese used naval force to besiege some of
the Spratly islands from Vietnam. Southeast Asian nations fear an expanding Chinese
Navy is indicative of similar campaigns to come. Moreover, in July of 2010, Chinese officials indicated territorial disputes in the South China Sea constitute a "core national
interest" of the PRe, equivocating them with other foreign policy priorities like Taiwan and Tibet (U.S. Library a/Congress 2010, 8).
According to the three proposed sources of CCP legitimacy, the Chinese will
likely use naval force to occupy the South China Sea if favorable negotiations cannot be
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reached. The oil and gas deposits surrounding the islands offer China an opportunity
for economic growth. Moreover, the Chinese's deep conviction of their own just cause,
coupled with the belief that the South China Seas dispute is a "core national interest"
of the PRC, guarantees aggressive actions to secure the territory will be considered a
protection of national interest with citizens at home. Moreover, it is also unlikely any
such action would disturb social stability. Thus, in total, aggressive maritime policy in
the South China Sea would only serve to bolster legitimacy for the communist regime.
Recent events suggest China is becoming more aggressive in its South China
Sea claims and is moving closer to military action. At the Southeast Asian Regional
Forum in July of 2010, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi implied that competing maritime claims from "smaller" Southeast Asian countries are subservient to claims from
"larger" countries, like China (Twining 2010). Many interpret Yang's statement to be
a justification for Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia and, consequently, a threat
to use coercive force. Later in the same month, Geng Yansheng, a spokesman for the
Ministry of Defense boldly asserted that China holds "indisputable sovereignty" over
the South China Sea, despite a recent statement by u.s. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton calling for reconsideration of the issue (Pomfret 2010; Clinton 2010). In each
of these cases, China's unwavering commitment reflects a willingness to use naval
force if negotiations fail to meet Chinese standards.

U.S.-China Relations
An enhanced Chinese Navy will redefine important dynamics in U.S.-China
military relations, particularly with regard to the Taiwan issue. Most scholars and analysts agree Chinese naval modernization is aimed, in large part, at preventing thirdparty participation in a future Taiwanese crisis. In other words, the new Chinese is
specifically designed to prevent the u.S. from aiding Taiwan, as it positioned itself
to do so in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis (U.S. Library of Congress 2010, 4). This reality is
reflected in China's procurement of anti-ship ballistic missiles, attack submarines, and
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance) systems. Together these advancements would allow the Chinese
to slow or halt the movement of American naval vessels to the Taiwan Strait but offer
little assistance in- conducting long-term naval operations abroad. The changed dynamic in U.s.-China relations is the American calculation to assist Taiwan in the event
of war. Whereas the U.s. was previously confident in its abilities to aid Taiwan, PRC
naval improvements might serve as an effective deterrence to u.s. involvement.
Although China's capabilities to engage the u.s. Navy will be increased after
modernization is complete, the Chinese have little incentive to provoke another Taiwanese conflict or, more broadly, challenge u.s. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.
Again, the Communist Party's need for legitimacy dictates these dynamics. Both Taiwan and the u.s. are substantial trading partners. Attacking either of these states
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would damage the Chinese economy and injure the party's legitimacy as provident
economic planners. However, if Taiwan instigates an armed conflict, the party's calculus would quickly reverse itself. Since Taiwan is considered a vital national interest,
the CCP's legitimacy would be weakened unless it sought to reclaim an independent
Taiwan. Therefore, while Chinese naval development will alter American calculations regarding a potential Taiwan conflict, it will not increase the likelihood of Chinese aggression against U.s. forces.

Projection of Power
China has limited experience in projecting naval power abroad. The majority of
its long-distance naval deployments have consisted of short anti-piracy exercises in the
Gulf of Aden (U.S. Library of Congress 2010, 5). This is primarily due to the purpose and
design of the Chinese. Until recent efforts of modernization, the PLAN was intended to
serve as a coastal defense and lacked the means to sustain itself on extended voyages.
Yet, with recent upgrades and a plan to build an aircraft carrier, the PLAN is beginning
to resemble a true, blue-water navy. In the future, perhaps in the next decade, China
will possess the capacity to project its naval influence around the world (U.S. Library of
Congress 2010, 6).
Despite its increased capabilities, China is not likely to increase its number of
international naval deployments. When they do engage in naval operations far from
home, the Chinese will likely be narrowly concerned with securing economic interests. Once again, this prediction is consistent with the Communist Party's desire to
ensure domestic legitimacy. Projecting naval force abroad provides little benefit for
internal stability. Furthermore, the Chinese have few key national interests-besides
those previously mentioned-that would necessitate naval intervention. China's use
of naval force in the coming years will likely be driven by economic interests and will
resemble China's past behavior in the Gulf of Aden. China will deploy limited forces
in order to protect sea lines of communication important to the Chinese economy. The
Office of Naval Intelligence agrees that outside of the Taiwan issue, advancements in
the Chinese are intended to address China's "economic dependence on sea lines of
communication" (U.S. Library of Congress 2010, 5).

Conclusion
The heightened sense of alarm surrounding China's growing navy is understandable. After all, few nations sit quietly while their neighbors are arming themselves.
However, with the exception of the South China Sea dispute, the rise of China's navy
will not translate into a more aggressive Chinese maritime policy. This prediction
is based on an understanding of the Communist Party's ultimate goal of regime legitimacy. The party has three means of enhancing domestic legitimacy: economic
growth, internal stability, and acting as a vanguard of the national interest. In the majority of these disputes, the economic advantages of a peaceful maritime policy take
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precedence over all other considerations. Therefore, disputes with China's closest
neighbors, like Japan and Korea, although tense, are highly unlikely to result in naval
conflict because of Japan and South Korea's importance to the Chinese economy. For
similar reasons, there is also no increased likelihood of Chinese aggression towards
the U.s., especially in regard to the Taiwan issue. The general projection of Chinese
naval power abroad is also likely to be limited and narrowly affiliated with strategic
protection of important commercial shipping lanes.
While Chinese naval growth does not increase the likelihood of a U.S.-China
naval conflict, the u.s. is not insulated from these developments. A more capable
Chinese will surely increase the costs in America's cost-benefit analYSis regarding any
future Taiwanese conflict. The U.S. must carefully reconsider its participation in such
an event and prepare itself for resistance from a more formidable opponent.
The other notable exception, and area of greatest concern, is the South China Sea
dispute. Unlike the aforementioned examples, both economic interest and the need to
uphold national interests coincide to suggest China will use its newly developed naval
force to intervene in the South China Sea. This sobering reality should give pause to
both students of foreign policy and the heads of state tied closely to this delicate issue.
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Branded: The Importance of Names
in Politics
Kirk Snider and Haley McCormick

Introduction
When studying the effect of politicians on the political realm as a whole, we
might ask ourselves how important is a name? Brand names are commonplace in
the everyday lives of Americans. Whether it is the purchase of cereal or a new car, the
name of the product is significant in the decision-making process. A name attachment
can create a sense of luxury or a sense of dependability when choosing between
products. This same phenomenon occurs with a politician's name. An officeholder's
name may persuade voters to believe something they may not have already or to vote
in a certain way. This happens merely because they trust the politician and trust the
actions he is taking while serving them.
The aim of our research is to identify whether or not attaching the name of a wellknown public figure to a public works project would increase or decrease support
of that project. In studying the Provo City Mayoral Election of 2009, we decided to
examine the name effect of the outgoing mayor on a public building project that would
soon be implemented in the city. Participating with the Utah Colleges Exit Poll, we
developed questions and included them on surveys administered to voters to measure
the effect name branding played on supporting the building of a new recreation center.
Both questions gauged support of a new recreation center; however, one form included
the name attachment of Mayor Lewis K. Billings while the other did not. The inclusion
of the departing mayor's name allowed us to examine several theoretical issues. The
question of trust in local political figures was a major focus. Whether the people of
Provo felt Mayor Billings was a trustworthy leader would undoubtedly influence the
support for a proposal using his name. We also raised the question of whether support
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for Mayor Billings' idea would be boosted simply by his retirement from office.
The idea of the public giving the outgoing politician a "pat on the back" as he leaves
office would be an important factor as to whether or not policies supported by the
politician would be supported by his constituents. On the other hand, we sensed many
Provo citizens were disappointed with other policies enacted and public works projects
implemented while Billings was in office. The implications of these perceptions would
generate less support for the new recreation center in the survey responses. We found
there was a statistically significant correlation between the name of the outgoing mayor
and the support of the building of a new recreation center. Ultimately, the inclusion of a
politician's name in this specific study did have a negative impact on how respondents
viewed his "product" -the new recreation center.

Literature and Theory
By attending town hall meetings, monitoring local media outlets, and speaking
with prominent and knowledgeable members of the Provo community, we discovered
several issues that could be relevant in examining public opinion towards elected
officials. In particular, the issue of iProvo seemed to strike a chord with the general
public as being a very regrettable endeavor. The mismanagement of this fiber-optic
Internet infrastructure became a blemish upon the latter end of the mayor's term,
effectively ending his candidacy for another re-election. This type of bad publicity
led us to question if attaching his name to a popular public works project would lead
to its disapproval.
The concept of iProvo was first brought to the city council in the 1990s. Much
debate ensued on whether this new project would be beneficial to the community and
a worthwhile investment. In 2004, construction finally began, taking nearly two years
to complete. Fiber-optic lines now ran between homes, businesses, and municipal
buildings including schools, hospitals, and traffic signals. This provided resources
for a city-wide service company to deliver affordable Internet access to community
members. However, the management of iProvo was seen as a large burden for the
city to handle, being the largest municipally owned fiber-to-the-home network
in the nation. The city council unexpectedly decided to sell the service to another
network managing company caJIed Broadweave. Although Broadweave anticipated
turning iProvo around and generating marginal profit, they were forced to merge
with another company, Veracity. This new holder of the project not only owed the
city $39.5 million but also asked for the monthly payments to the city to be reduced
by about 30 percent in order to gain capital. Veracity would pay the full amount due
plus interest at a later date than scheduled; however, many citizens still felt iProvo
had been a large disaster for the city. Many seemed to believe the local government
was at fault for the issues that had arisen and much blame had been placed upon the
mayor who had served for the last three terms (Toth 2009).
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Knowledge of the political climate surrounding public sentiment toward Mayor
Billings led us to make three claims: First, he was not viewed in a favorable light
when it came to the management of iProvo. Second, he was retiring from office, so
he might receive support and approval due to his voluntary decision to not run for
reelection after serving twelve years. Third, the public feeling toward Billings would
have an impact on a new policy he proposed that is attached to his name.
Because of the negative publicity Mayor Billings received for supporting iProvo,
we assumed the level of trust in the local government structure has been shaken.
In assuming that such distrust exists in the local political climate, there is a strong
likelihood the residents of Provo would be more aware of local issues that could
possibly affect their community. Such an awareness of local issues would foster
a greater involvement on the part of the citizenry, which would manifest itself in
an increase in individual participation with the political process (Bowler 2007).
Consequently, any projects started by government officials would either be widely
supported or widely condemned by the voting public in relation to their trust in
the local officials. This support or distrust of local issues could be influenced by the
voluntary departure of an unpopular politician, as is the case for Mayor Billings.
The literature in relation to the effectiveness of incumbents that are considered
"lame ducks" suggests publicity in the media can have a lasting impact on the
credibility of the politician leaving office Oohnson 1986, 52). Consequently, any
suggestions on future works by political figures that are not in viable contention
for reelection can be seen as "pitiful last gasps of a dying giant," which could in
tum change support for a neutral policy proposal Oohnson 1986, 50). This study
focused on "lame duck" presidents, but we argue this can be applied to any executive
officeholder who announces they will not run for reelection or who has reached their
term limits and is waiting to be replaced. We extend the theory presented by asserting
that when a politician leaving office is perceived negatively by their constituents and
the media, their policy proposals will be branded with their negative name and not
receive public support. In general, we assert that public opinion does have an effect
on public policy implementation. What is often in question within the discipline of
political science, however, is the extent of its effect. According to Burstein, "Public
opinion affects poiicy three-quarters of the times its impact is gauged; its effect is of
substantial policy importance at least a third of the time, and probably a fair amount
more" (Burstein 2003, 36). Taking into consideration that public opinion has an effect
on policy 75 percent of the time it is considered, we also assert the public's perception
of individual political actors is a critical factor. For those who are trying to pass policy
legislation, any negative attachment to bad projects or unpopular individuals within
the political environment can influence the passing of future proposals. The literature
that examines policy implementation suggests there are four sets of variables needed
to be present in order to execute policies on the local level, which are "characteristics
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of the policy and its goals, characteristics of implementing agencies, variations on
administrative and governmental processes, and beliefs and attitudes towards key
policy actors" (Harbin et al. 1992, 105; emphasis added). Assuming this to be true, a
government trying to implement a policy will not be able to do so if there are negative
attitudes toward the main political actors. This study validates our theory; politicians
with a negative name connotation will have a difficult time receiving public support
and will, therefore, have difficulty in passing a policy, proposal, or project branded
with his or her name.
Our hypothesis is that if Mayor Billings' name is included with a question about
approval for a new recreation center, then the overall approval for that project will be
lower than if his name is not included. In analyzing the data we have in relation to his
public approval, we also hypothesize that constituents with negative feelings toward
Mayor Billings will be less likely to support a new recreation center if it has his name
on it. Our final hypothesis is that respondents who feel iProvo was a bad idea will be
less likely to support the new recreation center proposed by Mayor Billings, because
our assumptions are grounded in the public sentiment towards the iProvo issue.

Methods
To test these hypotheses, the dependent variable is the approval for the recreation
center as measured by a five-point approval scale (strongly approve is equal to one;
strongly disapprove is equal to five). The independent variable is the presence or
absence of Mayor Billings' name within the question concerning the building of the
recreation center. A secondary issue we chose to analyze concerned the letter grade
given to Mayor Billings by the voting public. In the analysis of his letter grade, the
approval of the recreation center is still the dependent variable, but Mayor Billings'
letter grade is the main independent variable. Hence, we test the effect of his approval
on levels of support for the recreation center he proposed. The letter grade variable
is coded on a scale from 1 to 12 (1=A, 2=A-, 3=B+, etc). To check our assumption
that attitudes toward iProvo had an impact on perceptions of Mayor Billings, we
also ran a test where Billings' letter grade was the dependent variable and whether
a respondent thought iProvo was a good idea as the independent variable. This was
measured on a scale from one to five; one being strongly disagree and five being
strongly agree (See Appendix A).
In order to test our hypotheses we incorporated our questions on the survey
from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll. This was administered to voters in the Provo City
2009 Municipal Elections on 3 November. The survey was created by a committee of
students (including ourselves) in a political science course at Brigham Young University
dedicated to conducting exit polls. We were guided in our survey creation by professors
Quin Monson and Kelly Patterson. We sampled from every voting precinct in the city
using two separate survey forms throughout the day. We recruited students from BYU
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to administer the surveys at the various locations throughout the city. Respondents
were randomly selected by creating intervals according to the expected turnout for each
precinct, thereby ensuring every voter in Provo had an equal chance of being asked to
respond to both survey forms. After collection, the surveys were taken to a local Utah
company called DataWise that entered all of the results in a file we then could use to
run our statistical analyses. We used the computer program STATA in order to run these
statistical tests.

Analysis
The survey responses showed the issue of building a new recreation center is
popular among the citizens of Provo. The form that included Mayor Billings' name in
the recreation center question indicated that 54.85 percent of those surveyed would be
in favor of building the new center, while 59.62 percent of those surveyed supported
its construction on the form that excluded his name in the question. Although there
is a majority of support in both questions, there is a 5 percent discrepancy between
the form that included Billings' name and the form that did not. When examining
this shift, it appears the difference is between those who strongly supported the
initiative on the first form and those who opposed it on the second. The difference in
the strongly favored response shifted from 20.85 percent on the form including his
name to 25.28 percent on the form that did not. The majority of the 5 percent change
appears to have ended up in the oppose response, with 12.71 percent opposing the
plan with the mayor's name, and 8.39 percent opposing the plan without the mayor's
name (See Table 1).
Table 1: Responses by the voting public in support of building
a new recreation center.
Form w/ Name (' ;)

Form w/o Name (' ;,)

20.85

25.28

34

34.34

Neither Favor nor Oppose

28.21

28.38

Oppose

12.71

8.39

Strongly Oppose

4.24

3.69

897

894

Support of Rec. Center
Strongly Favor
Favor

N

(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

The scale used to measure support for the recreation center was an approval scale
of five options from one (strongly approve) to five (strongly oppose). The mean of the
responses on the form that included Mayor Billings' name was 2.45 on the recreation
approval scale, and the mean of the responses on the form that did not include his name
was 2.31, a statistically significant difference (p=O.04). This means those who received
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the form with Mayor Billings' name were less supportive of the construction of a new
recreation center. The finding of our analysis suggests the reputation of a politician to
the general public can have an influence on the support of a public work (See Table 2).
Table 2: Comparison of means test of the two forms used in the exit poll.
Support for rec. center

Mean

N

Form with Billings' name

2.45

897

Form wlo Billings' name

2.31

984

Difference

0.14

P-value: 0.04
t-value of t-test: 2.89
(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)
(For method, see Appendix B: I)

To better quantify our findings, we created a linear regression that compared the
two forms. We discovered that those who were presented a question about building
a new recreation center without Mayor Billings' name on it were 0.15 units lower on
the approval scale (which indicates more support of the initiative) than those who
were presented the question with his name. However, the variable of this regression
explains less than 0.47 percent of the variance in opinion (See Table 3). Once again,
the public perception of a public official had a statistically significant influence on the
support of the public project.
Table 3: Linear regression analysis of support for the recreation center
in relation to the color of form the respondent received.
Support of rec. center
Color of form

Coefficient
-0.15*

0.0047
'slgruficance greater than 1 percent
(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)
(For method, see Appendix B: II)

The next set of data we examined utilized the letter grade question rating Mayor
Billings' performance throughout his tenure as well as public support for the building
of the recreation center. Since the letter grade question was exclusive to a single form,
we were not able to include responses from both forms when running the data analysis.
In trying to determine the factors that influenced his support within the community,
we created several binary variables we could use to examine support of the recreation
center by the public. The use of binary variables made the coefficients easier to interpret
and allowed us to determine which factors contributed most to feelings about the
recreation center. We used a linear regression that would tell us the influence each
variable has on public opinion concerning the recreation center. The variables included
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in the regression were: marital status, income, level of conservatism, party affiliation,
number of children, level of education, and feelings toward iProvo (See Appendix B:
III). Since the issue of iProvo was pivotal in the creation of our hypothesis, we decided
to run two regressions, one excluding the iProvo variable and one that included it. The
results we present will follow in that order.
In the first regression that excluded the iProvo variable, we found there were
three statistically significant variables: the grade given to Mayor Billings, conservative
self-identification, and to a lesser extent, income, which was significant only at the
10 percent level. From the regression, we discovered as the letter grade of Mayor
Billings decreased by one unit (from A to A-, or from A- to B+, etc.), the support for
the recreation center decreased by 0.11 on a scale of five with a p-value of 0.00. Those
who considered themselves conservative were more likely to oppose the building
of the recreation center by 0.25 on the five-point approval scale than someone who
did not consider themselves conservative, with a p-value of 0.05. A one unit increase
in income classification resulted in a 0.04 unit increase in support for the recreation
center on a scale of five with a p-value of 0.06. Of the three variables, the letter grade
the respondents gave Mayor Billings had the greatest predictive value when trying to
determine whether a respondent would support the new recreation center or not. The
difference between someone who gave the mayor an "A" and a person who gave him
a "B" would result in a 0.33 drop in support for the recreation center. The next closest
variable is the level of conservatism (0.25). The R-squared value of this regression
was 0.1016, which means the variables in this particular regression only predicted
10.16 percent of the variance in a respondent's support for the recreation center (see
Table 4). The results of this regression were still only a partially complete without the
inclusion of the iProvo variable.
Table 4: Linear regression analysis of support for the recreation center
with variables from the exit poll survey.
Support for Rec. Center as determined
by the following variables

(1)

(2)

0.10*

Letter Grade for Mayor Billings

0.11*

Republican

-0.01

-0.01

Conservative

0.25**

0.23**

Married

-0.10

-0.10

Children

-0.00

0.00

-0.04+

-0.03+

Income
College Graduate
iProvo
R2

0.08

0.08

--

-0.09*

10.19
10.92
'slgruficance greater than 1 percent
"slgnificance greater than 5 percent
+significance greater than 10 percent
(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)
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In the second regression, we included all of the same variables as the first
regression, with the inclusion of the iProvo variable. The significance of each variable
was affected by its inclusion, and the number of variables that became significant
increased from three to four. We found the factors that significantly influenced the
support or opposition of building the recreation center were the grade given to Mayor
Billings, how conservative a person identified themselves as being, and the opinion of
whether iProvo was a good idea or not. Income was still significant at the 10 percent
level, but its significance dropped from a p-value of 0.06 to 0.08 w~th the inclusion of
the iProvo variable. From the regression, we discovered as the letter grade for Mayor
Billings decreased by one unit (from A to A-, or from A- to B+, etc.), the support for
the recreation center decreased by 0.10 on a scale of 5 (from one strongly approve to
five strongly disapprove) with a p-value of 0.00. The public'S opinion of iProvo was
also a strong indicator of its support for the recreation center. As iProvo approval
decreased, support for the building of the recreation center decreased as well by 0.09
on the scale of 5 with a p-value of 0.01. This means people who thought iProvo was
a bad idea were less likely to support the building of the recreation center as well.
The greatest predictor of support in the regression was still the letter grade given to
Mayor Billings by the respondents. The difference between those who gave the Mayor
an "A" and a those who gave him a "B" was a 0.30 drop in support for the recreation
center, with a p-value of 0.00. The R-squared value of this regression was 0.1092,
which means the variables in this particular regression only predicted 10.92 percent
of the variance in a respondent's support for the recreation center. From these results,
we see there is once again a significant relationship between the public's perception
of the former mayor and support for a new recreation center. Yet the influence of
iProvo on the letter grade of Mayor Billings is still important to examine.
By establishing that the letter grade given to Mayor Billings and the public
sentiment about iProvo were significant factors in predicting support for the building
of a new recreation center, we decided to look at the effect iProvo had on the letter
grade itself. In order to examine this possible correlation, we used another linear
regression. Our findings supported our initial hypothesis that feelings toward iProvo
were indicative of feelings toward Mayor Billings. In analyzing the data, for a unit
decrease in support of iProvo on the five point scale, there was a 0.68 decrease in the
letter grade for Mayor Billings, with a p-value of 0.00. This means if a respondent
moved on the response scale in the direction of not viewing iProvo as a good idea,
their letter grade of Mayor Billings would decrease by 0.68 for each shift in negative
opinion. The R-squared value for this regression is 0.1018, which means a respondent's
feelings about iProvo predicted about 10 percent of their approval of Mayor Billings
(see Table 5). This is significant when you consider it is only one in a wide range
of issues within the mayoral campaign. This statistical analysis validates our initial
assumption that iProvo affected the public's perception of Mayor Billings.
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Table 5: Linear regression analysis of Mayor Billings'
letter grade in relation to iProvo support

·significance greater than 1 percent
(Source: Utah Colleges Exit Poll data 2009)

Conclusion
The results of all of these statistical tests allow us to suggest the impact of
Mayor Billings' name decreased voter support of the proposed new recreation center.
The implications of such findings could prove very important to local officials in the
Provo area elsewhere in the United States. Lawmakers should recognize the approval
or disapproval of a prominent elected official could greatly influence whether a
proposed policy receives public support. This being said, public officials should be
wary of how they frame new proposals and issues to constituents. If they are not
receiving overwhelming support from their community members, it is possible
they will have a more difficult time implementing new policies or embarking on
new projects. This phenomenon is also evident at the national level of politics as
well. Near the end of his term in office, President George W. Bush had a very low
approval rating of 33 percent. Members of Congress who were in his own party did
not openly accept endorsements for office, presidential support for their bills, and so
on. Republican candidates in 2008 made it a point to distance themselves from the
current president. John McCain tried valiantly to show the American public he would
not be an extension of George W. Bush's eight years in office. Barack Obama used
this to his advantage and focused on the change that needed to occur in Washington
and went on to win the election with 53 percent of the popular vote as opposed to
McCain's 46 percent. This example in national politics illustrates on a broader and
more general scale the effect that occurred in the survey results from Provo, Utah.
As in any research in the discipline of political science, ours certainly has its
limitations. One concern may be that the support for the new recreation center was so
high, that the effect ofBillings' name did not have a very substantive impact, regardless
of statistical significance. The form that included his name would generate an average
that increased opposition to the center by .11 on the scale of one to five. Although
there was a statistical difference between this average and the average from the form
not including his name, arguably, one could say this may not be a large difference
overall. Another limitation might be the issue we chose to test in the community
was very middle-of-the-road, so to speak. The recreation center received very broad
support on both forms; this could suggest the influence of Billings' name could have
been minimal and lack substantive significance, despite its statistical significance.
The fact that our R-squared values are extremely low could be considered another
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limitation in our study. This means in our first regression (which examined support
for the recreation center in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of Billings' name) we
were unable to predict much of the variance of support by knowing whether his name
was included or not, as the R-squared value was only 0.47 percent. Our regression
that examined the factors which predicted support for the recreation center only had
an R-squared value of 10 percent meaning that by knowing all of the variables we
did (including how the respondent graded Mayor Billings), we could only predict
10 percent of the variance in support for the new recreation center. Both of these
values suggest there are issues outside of our analysis that had an impact on people's
perception of Mayor Billings and the public works project in general. This could be
categorized as omitted variable bias, which is seen as a limitation of our study. If we
had further time and resources, we would try to formulate more questions that would
help reveal why the public responded the way they did.
Overall, our theory of brand names in politics did appear to hold true. Knowledge
about branding has been imperative to consumer researchers, public relation
directors, and advertisers for decades and might even seem to be intuitive for politics
as well. We tested our hypotheses through survey research and statistical methods to
affirm the name of a politician, and the connotation that goes along with it, will affect
how their constituents view their policies, decisions, ideas, and so on. Officeholders
as well as councils, administrations, and other governing bodies should make note of
this as they pursue new initiatives to whatever public they may be serving.
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Appendix A
1. Blue form

a. Question [E]
i. "Do you favor or oppose a plan to build a new recreation center for
Provo?"
2. White Form
a. Question [E]
i "Do you favor or oppose a plan to build a new recreation center for
Provo as supported by Mayor Billings?"
b. Question [L] part c
i. "Building iProvo was a good idea."
c. Question [P]
i. "Thinking back on Lewis K. Billings' service as mayor, what grade
would you give him?"

AppendixB
I.

In order to examine the effects of the inclusion of Mayor Billings' name, we
decided to use a t-test to compare the means of each question on both forms in
relation to the support of building a new recreation center. We chose to use a
comparison of means test because we believed that there could be a statistically
significant difference between the results on the two forms since there was
variation in question wording. The scale that was used to measure support for
the recreation center was an approval scale of five options, from strongly approve
to strongly oppose. These responses were coded from 1 to 5, respectively. Before
we ran the statistical tests, we dropped any non-responses in relation to the
questions that we were examining. In so doing, we felt that the data collected
would be more accurate as to the general feelings of the public concerning
support of the recreation center in relation to the presence of Mayor Billings'
name. The superficial examination of the results showed that the inclusion of
Mayor Billings' name when suggesting the building of a new recreation center
fostered lower support for the public work as opposed to when his name was not
included. The statistical significance of the test supported our assumptions. The
outputs that we examined to determine statistical significance were the t-statistic
and the p-value of the test. The t-statistic that was produced in our model was
2.89, and the p-value produced was 0.04. Both of these figures suggest that there
is a statistically significant relationship between the two means of the forms
examined. This means that those that received the form which included Mayor
Billings' name were less supportive of the construction of a new recreation
center. The finding of our analysis suggests that the reputation of a politician to
the general public can have an influence on the support of a public work.

II.

In order to interpret the results on a micro level as opposed to a macro level, we
put the data into a linear regression model to examine the coefficient. A linear
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regression model allows us to determine an individual's likelihood of supporting the building of the recreation center and to what extent they will be swayed
by the change in question wording. We first examined the information in relation to the color of the forms used that differed between the form that used
Mayor Billings' name in the question and the form that did not. We changed
the variables from 1 and 2 representing colors to 0 and 1 to make the variable
binary. We did this to ensure ease in interpreting the data produced by the
regression. The forms labeled 0 were the forms that includeq Mayor Billings'
name on the question, and the forms labeled 1 were forms that did not include
his name. The scale of support that was used in the regression was the same as
was used in the t-test, with 1 representing those who strongly approved of the
recreation center and 5 representing those who strongly opposed it. We then
ran the regression with the dependent variable being the support for the recreation
center and the independent variable being the color of the form. The results of the
regression supported the results of the t-test. In examining the statistical significance of the regression, the p-value was 0.00 and the coefficient was -0.15.
This suggests that with a one unit increase in the dependent variable (which in
this case was the change from a form that did have Billings' name to a form that
did not), created a response that was lower by 0.15 units.
III. We created binary variables for marital status, conservatism, college education,
and party affiliation to create larger groupings and to make the distinction
between one group and another more distinct. We feel that the binary variables
gave us results that were easier to interpret than if we had left them as
continuous variables.
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NATO's Credibility in the
Kosovo War
Sead Osmani

Introduction
Before the conflict started in Kosovo, leaders from the u.s. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) explained why they intended to intervene in Kosovo.
They most strongly emphasized the reason as humanitarian intervention. With
research and comparison, I argue that sustaining NATO's credibility was the most
important reason. After the Cold War, Europe autonomously initiated security
projects. The main foreign policy interests of the U.s. and the EU started to diverge.
The differing interests eventually evoked discussions regarding the future of NATO,
with NATO officials offering various reasons for their participation in the Kosovo
War, such as ending violence and repression, and the withdrawal of the military,
police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo (NATO 2010). Were these goals NATO's
strongest motivation? Because the principal player in the Kosovo War was the
U.s., and because NATO is the instrument through which the u.s. perpetuates its
hegemOnic role in Europe, I will use the official U.S. Department of State document
regarding the Kosovo War to demonstrate that preserving NATO's credibility was
actually the most important reason for the U.s. and NATO to participate in the Kosovo
war. The Department of State official statement on the war in Kosovo outlines three
objectives for u.s. and NATO participation in Kosovo. The first objective is "Averting
a humanitarian catastrophe." I analyze whether Kosovo was the most pressing
humanitarian crisis in which NATO could have intervened and the level of success it
achieved in this effort. NATO did not accomplish this proclaimed goal, because the
goal was actually an excuse to intervene in Kosovo. The second Department of State
objective is "Preserving stability in a key part of Europe." With statements from the
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interested country leaders involved in this objective, I will demonstrate stability was
not truly at risk. The last section will offer my proposed explanation that the u.s. and
NATO intervened in Kosovo to preserve NATO's credibility.

Literature Review
The intervention by NATO has been the subject of a great deal of academic
commentary. NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization for the attack on
Yugoslavia, and the peculiar nature of the Kosovo conflict has led many scholars to be
divided in their opinions. They can be grouped into two categories: those who write
about NATO's illegitimacy in attacking (Hehir 2009 and Menon 2001) and those who
try to find legitimacy for this attack (Greenwood 2000, Roberts 1999, and Glennon
1999). Scholars of the first category argue U.s'/NATO did not seek UN Security
Council authorization to attack; therefore, the intervention was illegal. These
scholars fail to explain the reason U.S./NATO intervened without authorization.
The second category of scholars argue that while the U.s'/NATO did not have
explicit authorization, through the resolutions written for Yugoslavia, NATO had
implicit authorization from the UN Secretary General. Therefore, it was not necessary
to request further authorization. This plausible explanation essentially justifies a
controversial move. However, the UN Charter explains clearly that it is necessary
to obtain authorization for such moves. Explanations of how NATO avoided getting
explicit authorization for its actions unavoidably hint that NATO had underlying
motives for doing so. Those motivations have yet to be fully explored.
Many justify NATO's intervention citing humanitarian and moral duties, despite
the lack of legitimacy in attacking (Randy 2001, D' Amato 2001 and Simma 1999).
However, these claims can be questioned because NATO's use of force against Serbs
ultimately resulted in as many deaths as had already occurred (Herscher 2010). Others
try to explain that NATO's attack was biased and was driven by other motivations
such as economic interests or on distracting attention from the Lewinski sex scandal
(Cohn 2002 and Bulent 2002). The U.s./NATO attack in Yugoslavia was illegal. In
international law, there is no such thing as a "humanitarian" attack. The U.S. wanted
no international security in Yugoslavia other than NATO, wherein their power is
vested. The most powerful motivation for NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the
Department of State's third stated objective: to preserve NATO's credibility (Ong
2003, Cooper 1999, and Dempsey 1999).

U.S. and NATO Objectives in Kosovo
On 26 March 1999, the Department of State released an official statement entitled
"U.S. and NATO objectives and interests in Kosovo." It declares: "The U.S. and NATO
objectives in Kosovo are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that prevents
further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people." After this statement, it is listed that the u.s. had three strong interests at stake
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(U.S. Department of State 1999): 1) Averting a humanitarian catastrophe; 2) Preserving stability in a key part of Europe; and 3) Maintaining the credibility of NATO.
Two days prior to the u.s. Department of State release, President Ointon appeared
on national television and set down similar objectives, adding, "Our mission is clear: to
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand
the imperative of reversing course" (U.S. Department of State 1999).
Although the first two interests listed in the Department of State statement might
be reasonable justification for entering the Kosovo war, they were not achieved and
were rhetorical rather than authentic. In other words, they look like "pretexts for
U.s. and NATO policy, not motives behind the policy" (Layne 1999). The strongest
motivation was evidently to maintain NATO's credibility at all costs, but the other
reasons were needed to support that objective.

Averting a Humanitarian Catastrophe
Averting a humanitarian catastrophe was the first objective highlighted by the
U.s. Department of State and President Clinton. Rather than achieving the objectives,
the air campaign instead launched the crisis into colossal proportions. According
to James Bovard, a policy advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation, "The CIA
had warned the Clinton administration that if bombing was initiated, the Serbian
army would greatly accelerate its efforts to expel ethnic Albanians. The White
House disregarded this warning and feigned surprise when mass expulsions began"
(Bovard 2001). Arnold Kanter, former under secretary of state for Political Affairs,
said the u.s. has to "be highly selective and restrictive in our decisions about using
military force in humanitarian interventions, confining ourselves to the most serious
or egregious cases" (Frye 2000). According to Kanter, the u.s. should set a high bar
for its humanitarian intervention before participating in it. If the participation should
be confined to the most serious or egregious cases, then the question naturally arises:
Was Kosovo among the most serious or egregious cases? No atrocity in the world
should be underestimated, and each one needs clear and accurate attention. It is not
my intention to underestimate the Kosovo atrocities induced by Slobodan Milosevic;
I am the first one to condemn them. Nevertheless, it is important to put the Kosovo
War in perspective with other atrocities to understand whether intervention in
Kosovo was truly a humanitarian intervention.

Was Kosovo among the Most "Serious or Egregious Cases"?
Kosovo was not among the most exigent of egregious cases during the 1990s.
Several cases were (and continue to be) worse. The Kurds' situation in Turkey was far
more serious than the Kosovo case. According to a 1994 Human Rights Watch report,
thirty-nine thousand people died in the Kurdish southeast Turkey conflict, with over
half the losses occurring in the previous year. "Two million Kurds had been displaced
during ten years of conflict; 108 villages were depopulated only between 9 May and
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10 July 1994, and in the autumn of 1994 some 137 were demolished" (Human Rights
Watch 1994). In 2009, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which had
twenty-one members in parliament, was closed down by the Constitutional Court.
Turks strove to erase Kurdish culture by using threats of violence to ban Kurdish TV,
radio, and language (Human Rights Watch 2009). Kurds could integrate into Turkish
society only if they renounced any Kurdish identity.
Even though this apparent ethnic cleansing of the Kurds has been going on since
1984 and continues today, the u.S. and NATO have not interven~d to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. If the u.s. and NATO were truly seeking to simply avert a
humanitarian catastrophe, Turkey may have been a better destination than Kosovo.
Table 1: Comparison of Kurdish Crisis to Kosovar Albanian Crisis

Number of deaths

Number of villages,
hamlets, or settlements
partly or completely
destroyed

Number of
people displaced

Kurds in Turkey

39,000

7,932

2,000,000

Albanians in Kosovo
(as of 1998)

2,500

12

250,000

Albanians in Kosovo
(during NATO
action)

10,000

1,400,000

Source: Data adapted from Taft (1998), Bozerslan (2001) and Murphy (2004).

Though the u.S. apparently strove to deter a humanitarian crisis, their intervention
only aggravated the expulsion of Albanians. The estimated number of Kosovar
Albanians driven from their homes by Serb security forces prior to the October 1998
cease-fire is 250,000 (Taft 1998)16 The UN Refugee Agency estimated 100,000 refugees
from a potential conflict in Kosovo, prior to war (UNHCR 2000). The total number
of Kosovar Albanians driven from their homes prior to NATO's intervention was
350,000. On the other hand, the number of Kosovar Albanians expelled from Kosovo
by Serbs (March to June 1999 NATO's air campaign) was 863,000. (OSCE 2010) As the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shows in its report "Kosovo /
Kosova As seen, As told" the number of refugees continued to increase through all
seventy-eight days of NATO's air attack. (OSCE 2010).
Most alarmingly, this consequence was not unforeseen. On 27 March, 1999, U.s. /
NATO Commanding General Wesley Clark said it was "entirely predictable" that
Serb terror and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing," but on the same
day State Department spokesperson James Rubin said, "The U.s. is extremely alarmed
by reports of an escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on Kosovo Albanian civilian"
(Oines and Myers 1999).20 General Oark was apparently aware of possible violence
against Kosovar Albanian, but still wanted to attack Yugoslavia. It was estimated the
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NATO attack killed as many people as the Serbian attack did prior to the air strike
(Herscher 2010)21 This fact alone shows that preventing humanitarian catastrophe
was not the primary motivation.

Avoiding Humanitarian Catastrophe without Diplomacy while conceding to
Deal with Terrorist.
The UN Charter states that a member of the UN shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice" (UN 1945).22 The u.s. did not do what the Charter preSCribes in order to avoid
humanitarian catastrophe.
If the u.s. was purely motivated by preventing humanitarian catastrophe it
would have also tried to stop the KLA, which functioned on the Albanian side.
Before the Rambouillet Peace Accords, Ambassador Holbrooke, at that time assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, was sent by President Clinton in
October 1998 to seek a cease-fire in Kosovo and allow an international mission to
supervise the troop pullback (Crawford 2002)23 Many Western officials would later
accuse Milosevic of undermining the agreement, but these accusations were not
accurate (Solana 1999). General Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military
Committee in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said,
"The Yugoslav authorities honored the [Holbrooke] agreement" (ICTY 2002 25 recognizing only the Serbian side. Because of this agreement, the KLA used the Serbian
restraint as an opportunity to launch a new offensive. However, the KLA rejected
the agreement and it met no demands at all, and as General Naumann witnessed,
"the majority of violations [of the Holbrooke agreement] was caused by the KLA"
(ICTY 2002)26
Ignoring KLA caused more problems. George Robertson, former Secretary
of Defense in the Blair government, said in the Examination Witness of the UK
Parliament, "Up until Racak earlier this year [1999] the KLA were responSible for
more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav authorities had been" (UK Parliament
1999)27 The U.S. and NATO did not intervene. They asked Albanis for a ceasefire but
nothing else. If they had intervened, the war in Kosovo would have taken another
path, perhaps a diplomatic one without NATO's attack
Barton Gellman reported in the Washington Post: "U.S. intelligence reported almost
immediately that the KLA intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by
provoking Serb forces into further atrocities" (Gellman 1999)28 KLA leader, Hasim
Thaci, knew every time they provoked Serbs there would be a counterattack against
civilians, but he and other KLA leaders were willing to let many Kosovar Albanians
die (Little 2010).29 NATO would have been more eager to stop the KLA if they were
truly motivated by humanitarian motives.
U
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The KLA offensive increased and goaded the Serb forces to react to the offensive.
With that reaction, Western officials did not have trust in Serb officials, but on
the other hand, they did not do anything to stop the KLA offensive; instead they
helped the KLA. The London Sunday Times reported: "American intelligence agents
[associated with the OSCE mission] have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo
Liberation Army before NATO's numbing of Yugoslavia" (Walker and Aidan 2000)30
The US. was indeed sympathizing with the KLA. Alan Little, a BBC journalist, asked
Madeleine Albright, "[If] there was no clear mechanism to punish !the KLA] if they
failed to behave in what you call a reasonable way?" Albright answered, "Well, I
think the punishment was that they would lose completely the backing of the US.
and the Contact Group" (Little 2010)31 This statement suggests the US. was actually
supporting the KLA. In fact, the KLA received American intelligence support prior
to NATO's air strike (Walker and Aidan 2000). This assistance seems especially
duplicitous when KLA was recognized as a terrorist group by the US. itself (Bissett
2001).33 BBC News reported on 28 June 1998 that Robert Gelbard, US. Special envoy
for Kosovo, condemned KLA by saying, "I know a terrorist when I see one and these
men are terrorists" (BBC 1998).34 This statement was made prior to the Holbrooke
agreement, which was made in October 1998. Not only U.S. officials recognized KLA
as a terrorist group, but other members of NATO also did, such as Lord Ashdown,
Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the UK and later High Representative for Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In early 1998, the U.S. Department of State listed the Kosovo
Liberation Army as a terrorist group, but then in 1999 the U.S. and the Contact Group
dealt with the organization (Bissett 2001)35 It is clear the US. changed its position
toward KLA and its activities in order to attack Milosevic. Their willingness to deal
with terrorists shows their desperation to attack Milosevic and also to have the
opportunity to use NATO's power in order to preserve NATO's credibility, and also
shows their lack of a desire to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

Rambouillet Peace Accord without Real Diplomacy
Diplomatic approaches were lacking during the Rambouillet Peace Accords for
Kosovo, which can be called the" do what we tell you to do" accords. On that occasion,
the US. wanted only to command, to dictate the solution without compromising.
Their attitude and their firmness strongly implied the real issue was not to try
and avoid humanitarian catastrophe but something else. Even though the Clinton
administration was firmly convinced it was possible to solve the Kosovo problem
with an open and unconditional dialogue, the Rambouillet Peace Accord showed
the dialogue was unilateral, closed, and conditional. Albright arrived at Rambouillet
unwilling to have diplomacy without threat of force against Yugoslavia (Little 2010).36
On this occasion U.S. diplomats showed no skill and no desire to solve the problem
with peaceful diplomacy.
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According to Albright and James Rubin, it was necessary on that occasion
to have a clear-cut u.s. and NATO position. There was no real desire to seek an
agreement, because U.s. officials did not believe it was possible to find one with Serbs
(Little 2010).37 In the "Kosovo Report" the Independent International Commission
on Kosovo writes, "Albright and others had been so firm about the supremacy of
NATO over any other institutional actor in this context, and so many aspects of the
Rambouillet process had been presented as explicitly non-negotiable, that there
was little reason for Serbia to have expected flexibility from NATO. If a deal were
possible, it would have had to have been initiated by NATO powers" (Oxford 2000).38
Albright's determination that NATO was the only solution for Kosovo shows the
problem was not avoiding humanitarian catastrophe but establishing the supremacy
and credibility of NATO. The events in Kosovo happened at the right time and the
right place.
The lack of diplomacy and the pretenses to use NATO were clear in Annex B
of the Rambouillet Peace Accord. Toward the end of the meetings, the Serbian
delegation accepted the political aspects of the accord. Christopher Hill, former
ambassador to Macedonia, said Milosevic was open to the political deal offered in
Rambouillet (Oxford 2000). The biggest problem the Yugoslavian delegation found
was in Annex B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation force. In this
annex, it is stated that a NATO peacekeeping force would occupy Kosovo, as well
as Yugoslavia if necessary. It is obvious the Serbian delegation would not accept
this part of the agreement, because it violated the principle of sovereignty. Henry
Kissinger said, "The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops
throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet
is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible
diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form" (Kissinger
1999). Before a definitive "no" from the Serbs, there were signs they might accept
international peacekeepers, like OSCE or UN, but not under NATO (Rendell 1999).4
U.s. diplomats refused that idea. In a CNN interview, Albright said, "There is no
question that the basis of the deal is a NATO-led force" (Albright 1999). Since the
u.s. did not want other international peacekeepers, it did not sincerely intend to find
a peaceful solutio~. In fact, a u.s. official told the press the u.s. intentionally set the
bar high in order for the Serbs to comply. Lord John Gilbert, UK Minister of State for
Defense Procurement, in an "examination of witness" declared "I think the terms put
to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable; how could he possibly accept
them; it was quite deliberate" (UK Parliament 2000).
Even though the Rambouillet agreement did not introduce a referendum for an
independent Kosovo-which the KLA leaders wanted and is the reason they did not
at first accept the agreement-at the end, the Albanian delegation did sign the peace
accord, leaving Serbs alone. Signing was a simple tactic the KLA used because it was
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easier for them to let NATO have a war with Serbia than for the KLA to have a war with
Serbia. This tactic was, in some ways, suggested by Albright. Veton Surroi, Kosovo
Albanian Political Leader said that Albright was very clear with Hashim Thaci, KLA
leader. He reported: "She was saying you sign, the Serbs don't sign, we bomb. You
sign, the Serbs sign, you have NATO in. So it's up to you to say. You don't sign,
the Serbs don't sign, we forget about the subject" (Little 2010). It was intentionally
calculated by u.s. diplomats to put NATO in Yugoslavia. Diplomacy was not present
in Rambouillet, because the two interested parties were never together to discuss
the issues, but discussion happened separately and through letters (Auerswald and
Auerswald 2000).
In brief, the humanitarian catastrophe was not avoided and as the British
committee on Foreign Affairs said: "We accept the view of expert witnesses that the
North Atlantic Treaty gives NATO no authority to act for humanitarian purposes,
and we recommend that the government examine whether any new legal instrument
is necessary to allow NATO to take action in future in the same manner as it did
in Kosovo" (Select Committee on Foreign Affaires 2000). NATO did not have any
authority to act because there is no "right" of humanitarian intervention that could be
found in the UN Charter or in the international law. Even the u.s. rejected supporting
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2001). The only convincing
purpose for the intervention is for NATO's own credibility.

Preserving Stability in a Key Part of Europe
The second objective President Clinton, his administration, and NATO suggested was preserving stability in a key part of Europe. According to them, the ethnic
cleansing would cause many Kosovar Albanians to leave their country. Neighboring
countries did not want refugees, because they would create tensions and ultimately
destabilization in Europe. This objective might be important, and it is not possible to
say with firmness the Kosovo War could not destabilize that part of Europe; nevertheless, it is possible to say it was not likely to happen because Macedonia, Albania,
and Montenegro accepted all the Kosovo refugees. The only concern these countries
had was receiving enough international aid for the refugees. The coming of those
refugees was relatively organized and under control (CNN 1999).
In his address to the American people, President Clinton said, "Let a fire burn
here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key u.s. allies could be
drawn into the conflict." According to the Congressional Research Service, the allies
President Clinton was referring to are Greece and Turkey (Migdalovitz 1999).

Greece and Turkey's Reactions
The Greek prime minister was at first opposed to NATO's intervention in Kosovo
without the UN mandate but later passively accepted NATO, even though Greece did
not participate in military operations (Migdalovitz 1999). In response to President
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Clinton's statement regarding a possible conflict in the region, the prime minister
"disagreed ... that this development could lead to conflict with Turkey," and said,
"Greece ... is a stabilizing force in the area. There is no reason for anyone to fear that
there will be implications with Turkey" (Migdalovitz 1999, 4). It is clear the Greek
political leaders did not agree with President Clinton's statement. Greece did not
recognize any possible destabilization of the region.
Turkish political leaders also differed with President Clinton's statement. The
Turkish foreign minister said, "A state of war between Turkey and Greece due to
the Kosovo crisis is possible only if Greece supports Serbia by leaving NATO and
fights NATO. And I don't expect that such a situation will happen." The Turkish
leaders equally refused to believe that the Kosovo War would have implications
with Turkey and the Kurds in the southeast Turkish region (Migdalovitz 1999, 5).
In brief, President Clinton's statement regarding the destabilization of a certain
part of Europe does not rely on any great support. Turkish and Greek political leaders
assured the destabilization in that part of Europe was almost impossible; therefore,
destabilization was not a valid concern, even if it was possible. History agreed with
Turkey and Greece.

Proposed Explanation: NATO's Credibility
My proposed explanation for U.S./NATO participation in the Kosovo war is that
NATO's credibility was at stake. In order to explain why this proposed explanation is
the most credible, it is necessary to give a short background of NATO and EU history.
NATO History in Context

During the Cold War era, Europe's predominant defense force was NATO, which
was mostly the u.S. with its powerful nuclear capabilities. Europe needed the U.s.,
and this need made the u.s. a dominant power in Europe. As Theodore Draper points
out, NATO was an arrangement, not an alliance: "It was, in effect, a unilateral U.S.
guarantee of European security, because only the U.s. was able to defend itself and
any of the members" (Draper 1983). But with the end of the Cold War, NATO became
a very strange institution without any obvious purpose.
Throughout the 1990s, u.s. policymakers wrestled with the problem of reinventing
NATO, particularly the redefinition of both its purpose and its membership. In the
meantime, Europe started to think about its own defense and security projects,
which made the u.s. uncomfortable. In April 1990, President Bush wrote to France's
President Mitterrand: "NATO is the only plausible justification in my country for the
American military presence in Europe. If NATO is allowed to wither because it has no
meaningful political place in the new Europe, the basis for a long-term U.s. military
commitment can die with it" (Sarotte 2010). As President Bush said, NATO's living
purpose is being present in Europe to defend Western Europe, but Europe started to
see NATO's purpose as no longer necessary in the new Europe. U.s. political leaders
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understood NATO was entering a crisis. In November 1991, NATO held a summit in
Rome, after the London meeting of 1990, to find a better reason for NATO's existence,
and to "transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in
Europe" (NATO 1991). NATO would have a different function from its role in the
Cold War.
EU History in Context
On 7 February 1992, twelve European countries signed the treaty on the EU, also
known as "The Maastricht Treaty," in which these countries undertook to implement
a "common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common
defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense, thereby reinforcing
the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and
progress in Europe and in the world" (EU 2010). This event is significant because
it was the first time an official document talks about a common European defense.
Fearing a possible failure of their organization, NATO leadership organized a meeting
in Berlin with the foreign ministers and representatives of the member countries of
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In this meeting, it was decided the Western
EU would oversee the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
within NATO structures «North Atlantic Council 1996). This creation was necessary
to avoid a possible independent European defense that would "destroy" NATO.
Nevertheless, on 2 October 1997 the European Community signed the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Through this treaty, they created the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and they initiated the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP), now known as Common Security and Defense Policy (Treaty
of Amsterdam 1997). The next year at the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, there was a joint
declaration between France and the UK on European defense. An important passage
of the declaration stated: "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action,
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises." (Foreign and Commonwealth
Office 1998). This statement declared the ESDP road map clearly does not include
NATO but instead a separate and autonomous defense force.
The Clinton Administration started to become nervous about Europe's steps
on defense. In fact, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said, "We would not
want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out
of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI
that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO"
(Howerth and Keeler 2003). Clearly, the u.s. did not want any competition for
NATO. Even though EU members did not explicitly want to weaken NATO, none
could really foretell what the future would hold or what would be the eventual
nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. did not want, and still does not want,
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to accept this outcome, because NATO's presence in Europe means the u.s. will
continue to have a strong influence in Europe, and it will continue to exercise its
military hegemony there. The u.s. has done everything to preserve its power by
demonstrating NATO's necessity and credibility. NATO's credibility was at stake as
it approached its fiftieth birthday.

Kosovo War
The Kosovo conflict was a perfect opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to display
their power and influence. After the war in Bosnia, and prior to NATO's fiftieth
anniversary, it was necessary to show NATO needed to exist and Europe could do
without the Atlantic Alliance. MiloseviC's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was the perfect
opportunity to exercise NATO's power and to strengthen the u.s: hegemony in
Europe. Kosovo was to be a new sort of war, one fought in the name of universal
values and prinCiples, rather than for narrow interests. In all the Yugoslavia conflict,
but especially in Kosovo, the Europeans wanted to take the lead with diplomatic
means, but the u.s. acceded, because if the Europeans had to work through diplomacy,
it would mean NATO had to be sidetracked; and if NATO led, it would provide a
central role for the u.S. and NATO (Hyland 1999).
The U.s. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was the biggest NATO supporter.
Albright started to talk about bombing Yugoslavia from the beginning. This bombing
had to be under NATO (Albright 2003). In order to have a NATO attack, the alliance had to have a legal right to intervene unilaterally in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the
alliance did not have that legal right, because it would violate the UN Charter. The
British Foreign Minister Robin Cook wanted UN Security Council authorization, but
Albright stopped him, saying in a phone conversation with him, "If a UN resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council
authorization before it could act" (O'Connell 2000, 384). It was not possible to ask for
UN approval, because the U.S. did not want to validate the principle that the Security Council held an effective veto over NATO decisions, a position Congress would
never accept. Therefore, the motive was used of avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo: a justification for NATO's action.
Right before the air attack, the Clinton Administration and NATO officers
campaigned strongly for NATO's intervention. Albright, together with Holbrooke,
argued with the members of the Alliance that an agreement for peace was achievable
only if NATO authorized the use of force (Albright 2003), otherwise there would be
no other occasion where NATO could show its power and, therefore, its necessity
in Europe. The former secretary alone said the Kosovo situation was a "key test of
American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of NATO" (Albright 2003,
391).6 Milosevic's ethnic cleansing carne at the right moment for the U.S., and they
used it to show NATO's credibility.
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If Milosevic was the only problem, and if it was necessary to remove him from
office, the u.s. could have done it. Michael Dobbs, Washington Post foreign service
journalist, wrote an article explaining that American pollster Doug Schoen helped
MiloseviC's opposition overthrow him. Dobbs wrote: "The lead role was taken by
the state department and the u.s. Agency for International Development, the government's foreign assistance agency, which channeled the funds through commercial contractors and nonprofit groups such as NDI and its Republican counterpart,
the International Republican Institute (IRI)" (Dobbs 2000).6 U.S. officers often met
Milosevic opposition in Hungary for various seminars and helped it financially. In
this way, Milosevic was overthrown. Now the question naturally arises: Could the
u.s. not do the same thing in the elections prior to the NATO attack? The answer is,
yes. The demonstrations in 1996-97 showed Serbians were tired of Milosevic. Unfortunately, the U.S. had another plan in mind, which involved NATO's credibility.
Many scholars have discussed NATO's possible failure: "If NATO cannot meet
this challenge and defeat it, why does the alliance still exist?" "NATO will be sunk if
it loses." Any retreat "would be a deadly blow to NATO" (Bandow 1999, 81). The fear
of failing and losing credibility was high.
NATO's credibility prevailed over avoiding humanitarian catastrophe and destabilization of a part of Europe. The British House of Commons Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs wrote in its report on Kosovo that: "Carl Bildt [former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina] is reported as having been told by White House
staff ten days before the bombing started that NATO needed to launch air strikes in
order to save its credibility" (House of Commons 1999). This is further evidence of the
real objective the u.s. and NATO had in mind.
After eleven weeks of continual bombing, Milosevic agreed to a peace plan. In
that agreement, the sovereignty of Yugoslavia was recognized, the presence of the
UN was confirmed, and NATO and UN presence was finalized just on Kosovo territory. This is the agreement Yugoslavia's government almost accepted in Rambouillet
(Bilder 1999). If U.s./NATO accepted the agreement after the air strike, they could
have accepted it before the air strike, unless this tactic was planned in order to win
against Milosevic and to show NATO's credibility and power.
After the retreat of Serbs from Kosovo, the KLA started its own revenge against
Serbs. Many atrocities during that year happened when NATO-led KFOR was responsible for security in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006, 53). All told, almost a quarter of a
million people fled Kosovo during the period after the war ended (BBC 2003). Nevertheless, the media and the international community did not emphasize the problem in
the same way they emphasized the Serbs' attack against Kosovar Albanians.
NATO's intervention was seen as a triumph. It had to be that way to show
NATO's credibility and necessity even more. The U.S. reaffirmed U.s. hegemony and
set a precedent that NATO could go to war virtually whenever it wished, without
76

OSMANI
the authorization of the UN Security Council. The U.S: dominance over Europe was
preserved. The main benefit of the Kosovo War for the u.s. was the reestablishment
of the key institution of U.s. hegemony in Europe: NATO.
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